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 A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship 
Defense 
Nicole Buonocore Porter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),1 employ-
ers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified employees 
with disabilities unless those accommodations would cause an undue hard-
ship.2  Several issues arise from that one sentence.  First, who has a disability?  
Second, who is qualified?  Third, what are reasonable accommodations and 
when do they have to be provided?  And finally, what is an undue hardship and 
how is it defined?  All but the last of these questions have received considerable 
attention in the courts3 and in scholarly literature.4  The undue hardship issue 
is the exception.  Specifically, most of the scholarly work aimed at analyzing 
the undue hardship provision was written around the time that the ADA was 
first passed in 1990.  In fact, the last article5 that explored the meaning of the 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, Uni-
versity of Toledo College of Law.  The author would like to thank participants at the 
Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop at the University of Toledo College of Law for their 
helpful feedback.  Thanks also to Bryan Lammon, for everything. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12111–17 (2018). 
 2. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 3. See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota Motor 
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2009); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 
U.S. 555 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (2009); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009); 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2009). 
 4. It would be impossible to cite to all of the literature written on these issues.  
Instead, this is a list of disability scholars whose work on these (and many other) issues 
has influenced me (in alphabetical order): Bradley A. Areheart, Samuel Bagenstos, Car-
los A. Ball, Kevin M. Barry, Stephen Befort, Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Ruth Colker, Jean-
nette Cox, Mary Crossley, Chai Feldblum, Harlan Hahn, Ann Hubbard, Christine Jolls, 
Alex B. Long, Elizabeth Pendo, Jessica L. Roberts, Laura Rothstein, Ani B. Satz, Anita 
Silvers, Michael Ashley Stein, Michelle Travis, Michael Waterstone, and Mark C. We-
ber.  I apologize in advance if I forgot anyone. 
 5. This refers to a more in-depth analysis given in a full article written by a legal 
academic.  Most of the writing on the undue hardship provision was student-authored 
notes and comments.  Without denigrating those valuable pieces of scholarship, many 
of which I cite to in other work, see generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Cumulative 
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undue hardship provision was written twenty-two years ago in 1995.6  This 
Article attempts to fill that lengthy void. 
This comprehensive investigation into the undue hardship provision is es-
pecially important at this point in the history of the ADA.  The ADA was 
passed in 1990 with overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress.7  Despite 
this promising beginning, it was not long before federal courts began dramati-
cally narrowing the class of individuals protected by the statute.8  For many 
years, most ADA cases were dismissed at the summary judgment stage with 
courts holding that the plaintiffs did not have a disability and therefore could 
not proceed with the merits of their cases.9  As a result, there was not much 
litigation involving the most important provision of Title I of the ADA—the 
reasonable accommodation provision and its accompanying defense—the un-
due hardship defense.  Congress was unhappy with the narrowed interpretation 
of the ADA and consequently passed the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) 
in 2008.10 
The ADAAA dramatically expanded the definition of disability, and, as I 
discuss in other work,11 courts have (for the most part) followed Congress’ 
mandate for an expanded protected class.12  This means that more cases have 
proceeded and will continue to proceed past the issue of coverage (which fo-
cuses on whether the employee has a disability protected by the statute) and on 
to the merits of the case, which often involve issues of reasonable accommo-
dations.13  As more cases reach the issue of reasonable accommodation, there 
are likely to be more cases reaching the issue of the defense to an employer’s 
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation—the undue hardship de-
fense.  To be clear, this Article is not limited to an analysis of undue hardship 
 
Hardship, GEORGE MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3036619 [hereinafter Porter, Cumulative Hardship], articles written by legal 
academics have the ability to explore issues in more depth and detail. 
 6. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Em-
ployer’s Financial Hardship Becomes Undue, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 422–27 (1995). 
 7. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 5–6 (2005); Alex B. Long, Introducing the 
New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) (“[E]xpectations for the 
[original] ADA [had been very] high.”). 
 8. E.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 
8–11 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash]; see also Long, supra note 7, at 218. 
 9. See Long, supra note 7, at 228. 
 10. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 4; see Long, supra note 7, at 217–18. 
 11. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 3, 46–47. 
 12. Id; see also Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes 
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2050–51 (2013). 
 13. See Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 4; Befort, supra note 12, at 2029; Jean-
nette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L. J. 
187, 204 (2010). 
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cases that have been decided since the ADAAA went into effect.  Instead, be-
cause we are in an era where more reasonable accommodation issues are being 
litigated, I believe this is an especially important time to take a new look at the 
undue hardship provision since the ADA’s enactment.  This Article is mostly 
a descriptive piece.  I did not begin the project with any specific normative 
goal, and this Article does not propose any reform in this area.  Instead, my 
goal was to simply take a closer look at how courts have been deciding issues 
of undue hardship and to see if any trends or themes emerged. 
For all of the years I have been teaching employment discrimination and 
disability law (every year since 2004), I have frequently told my students that 
the undue hardship provision is relatively irrelevant—that very few cases turn 
on the undue hardship defense.14  When I began reviewing undue hardship 
cases for other work,15 I was somewhat surprised that there were so many 
cases.16  But upon further review of these cases, most of them are simply citing 
the statutory provision and do not involve a discussion of the undue hardship 
provision.17  Nevertheless, the cases that do discuss undue hardship provide 
some interesting insights.  This Article will not only summarize and attempt to 
categorize the undue hardship cases but will also identify three trends that be-
come apparent when engaging in a thorough analysis of this body of cases. 
This Article will proceed in four additional parts.  Part II will provide the 
background of the undue hardship provision, including the statutory language 
and its regulations, the legislative history, and the undue hardship cases de-
cided under the precursor to the ADA—the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Part 
III will delve into the undue hardship cases under the ADA.  Even though most 
people think about undue hardship as mostly involving financial cost, this Part 
will reveal that relatively few cases turn on the actual costs of the accommoda-
tion.  Part IV will identify three trends in the courts’ decisions that only became 
apparent when I engaged in a deep dive of these cases: (1) courts often confuse 
or conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry and the undue hardship de-
fense; (2) whether an accommodation places burdens on other employees (what 
I call “special treatment stigma”) is frequently relevant to the undue hardship 
defense; and (3) the phenomenon of “withdrawn accommodations” often influ-
ences courts’ analyses of the undue hardship defense.  These themes not only 
provide a deeper insight into the undue hardship defense but also help to more 
broadly illuminate the scope of an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodations.  Finally, Part V will conclude. 
 
 14. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER, DISABILITY LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 186 (West Academic 2016). 
 15. See generally Porter, Cumulative Hardship, supra note 5. 
 16. A Westlaw search (as of June 18, 2017) of “ADA /s ‘undue hardship’” resulted 
in 1,997 results. 
 17. I identified only about 120 cases that actually engaged in an undue hardship 
discussion rather than simply citing the statutory language. 
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II. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP PROVISION 
A. The Statute and Regulations 
The ADA is considered an anti-discrimination statute, but it has two pro-
visions18 that set it apart from other anti-discrimination statutes—primarily Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).19  The first difference is 
unlike Title VII, which protects all employees from discrimination based on 
race, sex, color, religion, and national origin, the ADA has a much smaller 
protected class.20  Plaintiffs have to prove that they have a disability, which is 
defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.21  The other primary difference is the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation provision.22 
The ADA defines “discriminate” to include “not making reasonable ac-
commodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity . . . .”23  
The “undue hardship” defense provides the outer limit of an employer’s obli-
gation to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA.  It is defined in 
the statute as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when con-
sidered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).”24 
Subparagraph (B), in turn, provides the factors to be considered: 
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include – 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this 
chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the num-
ber of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and 
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon 
the operation of the facility; 
 
 18. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018). 
 20. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 7. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 22. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 8. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 24. Id. § 12111(10)(A). 
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(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall 
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number 
of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, in-
cluding the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce 
of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal 
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered 
entity.25 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has pro-
vided some additional direction on the undue hardship provision.26  First, the 
EEOC regulations suggest that an additional factor that should be considered 
is “the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the 
impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business.”27  The EEOC also issued 
guidance, which states that an accommodation could impose an undue hardship 
if it would “fundamentally alter the nature of the operation or business.”28  The 
EEOC guidance also notes that an employer will not have an undue hardship 
defense based on employees’ or customers’ fears or prejudices toward the in-
dividual with a disability.  Similarly, undue hardship cannot be based on the 
fact that providing a reasonable accommodation will have a “negative impact 
on the morale of other employees.”29  However, employers might be able to 
establish an undue hardship defense if an accommodation would be “unduly 
disruptive to other employees’ ability to work.”30 
B. Legislative History 
Because there is relatively little case law under the undue hardship provi-
sion,31 it is helpful to examine the legislative history of the ADA to determine 
what Congress thought the provision meant.  As stated by one commentator, 
“The undue hardship standard was one of the most controversial elements of 
the ADA during its consideration in Congress.”32  Originally, the ADA called 
for a higher standard than we currently have—an accommodation would have 
 
 25. Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
 26. See generally EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_114 [hereinaf-
ter EEOC Guidance]. 
 27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (2018). 
 28. EEOC Guidance, supra note 26. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra Section III.C. 
 32. Jeffrey O. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The 
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1448 (1991). 
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to threaten the continued existence of the employer’s business.33  Proponents 
called it the “bankruptcy provision,” but it was subsequently altered to the 
standard we have now in “the spirit of compromise.”34  Still, the legislative 
history indicated that the undue hardship provision has a high bar.  For instance, 
Senator Lowell Weicker stated that the “costs associated with this bill are a 
small price to pay for opening up our society to persons with disabilities.”35 
We know that Congress intended the undue hardship standard to be 
greater than the undue hardship defense under the religious accommodation 
provision of Title VII, where anything more than a de minimis cost is consid-
ered an undue hardship.36  But we do not know too much more about defining 
the specific standard that Congress intended.37  “One Congressman urged his 
colleagues to develop a ‘concrete formula,’” and another insisted that busi-
nesses need some way of being able to predict what they are responsible for 
when it comes to accommodating individuals with disabilities.38  Two attempts 
to provide a more concrete formula failed.  The first was to “limit [an em-
ployer’s] expenditures to five percent of annual net profit for businesses with 
gross annual receipts of $500,000 or less.”39  This amendment failed by a large 
margin.40  The other amendment proposed would have capped the cost of an 
accommodation at ten percent of the disabled employee’s annual salary.41  This 
amendment was rejected by a vote of 25-11 in the Senate and 213-187 in the 
House.42 
Here is what we do know from the legislative history.  First, courts should 
consider the net cost, not the gross cost when deciding if an accommodation 
causes an undue hardship.43  So if an employer receives tax credits or other 
benefits for the accommodation, these would offset the accommodation’s 
cost.44  Second, “the court must take into account the number of employees, 
presently and in the future, who will benefit from the proposed accommoda-
tion.”45  Thus, an accommodation that might cause an undue hardship if it will 
 
 33. Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 923, 927. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Epstein, supra note 6, at 422–23. 
 36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II) (1990) (stating that the undue hardship 
standard is a significantly higher standard than the one used in Hardison and that this 
is “necessary in light of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensur-
ing meaningful employment opportunities for people with disabilities.”). 
 37. In fact, one scholar described it as a “standard so vague as to amount to no 
standard at all.”  Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450. 
 38. Epstein, supra note 6, at 426. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 426–27. 
 43. Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II). 
 44. See Cooper, supra note 32, at 1450. 
 45. Id. at 1451. 
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only be used for one employee might not cause an undue hardship if it could 
be shared by five employees with disabilities or if other employees might also 
benefit from the accommodation.46  Third, courts need to distinguish costs to a 
particular facility versus costs to the entity as a whole.47  As discussed above, 
an accommodation can pose an undue hardship without threatening the exist-
ence of the employer’s business as a whole.48  But with respect to the undue 
hardship in relationship to the particular facility, although Congress did not 
want an entity to shut down a marginal facility rather than absorb the cost of 
the proposed accommodation at that particular facility, Congress was appar-
ently willing to place fairly high costs on an entity as long as a particular facil-
ity is not threatened with closure or job loss.49 
We also know that Congress expected that the reasonable accommodation 
provision would be a significant obligation.  Some evidence of this includes 
the fact that the legislative history referenced readers and interpreters several 
times, both of which are very costly accommodations.50  The legislative history 
also mentioned another expensive accommodation, personal attendants, stating 
that whether or not a personal attendant hired to help a disabled employee when 
traveling for work or with other job-related functions would constitute an un-
due hardship should be decided on a case-by-case basis.51 
C. Undue Hardship Cases Under the Rehabilitation Act 
Much of the early scholarship about the ADA was very critical of the 
amorphousness of the undue hardship provision.  The concern was that the 
vagueness of the standard would lead to an abundance of litigation over the 
meaning of the undue hardship provision.  There was also significant concern 
about the costs of complying with the reasonable accommodation provision, 
given that the undue hardship definition—significant difficulty or expense—
seemed to create a fairly high bar. 
For instance, one commentator stated that he believed the ADA was going 
to be very costly for employers—costing as much as several billion dollars an-
nually.52  Another commentator thought it was naïve for Congress to assume 
that the accommodation mandate in the ADA would not be expensive; he was 
responding to a Senate Report that noted the costs to do business were “ex-
pected to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing accommo-
dations, with 51% of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at 
 
 46. See id. at 1451. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1451–52. 
 50. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116 (1989). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L. J. 1, 4 (1990). 
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all.”53  His response was that it was unrealistic to believe that the population of 
unemployed individuals with disabilities would not need significant accommo-
dations; thus, “although accommodation costs prior to the ADA may have been 
‘no big deal,’ accommodation costs under the ADA—particularly for those dis-
abled citizens pulled into the employment sector for the first time—may be a 
very big deal indeed.”54 
Steven Epstein also complained about the vagueness of the standard.55  
His central thesis was that Congress should not have adopted such a vague 
standard because it fails to inform covered entities and their employees with 
disabilities of the nature of the employer’s obligations and the employees’ 
rights.56  He also argued that a vague standard will cause employers to feel 
coerced into giving accommodations to avoid being wrong in litigation and that 
it will create tense, if not hostile, relations between employers and employees.57  
His argument was that it is unfair to impose liability on an employer for failure 
to comply with an obligation that Congress consciously decided not to define 
clearly.58  It was also unfair to require employers to spend money to obtain 
clarity through the litigation process.59  Finally, it also put “job applicants and 
employees in the awkward position of not knowing what accommodations they 
can rightfully demand” from their employers.60 
In response to arguments that the undue hardship provision is too vague 
and undefinable, Congress pointed to cases that had been decided under the 
predecessor to the ADA—Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.61  However, 
several scholars complained that those cases did not provide a consistent stand-
ard.62  Others pointed out that there were not that many cases compared to the 
number of cases that would get filed under the ADA.63  It seems to me that 
 
 53. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 428–30. 
 54. Id. at 429–30. 
 55. See generally id. 
 56. Id. at 397. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 440–41. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 442. 
 61. See, e.g., Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 114 (1990) (“ADA’s legislative history 
states that federal agencies applying the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship 
language should do so consistently with interpretations under the Rehabilitation Act.”); 
Crespi, supra note 52, at 13 (discussing the intentions of the Senate Committee regard-
ing the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act to ADA coverage). 
 62. See, e.g., Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns 
Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1311, 1334–36 (1991); Brandfield, supra note 61, at 114. 
 63. Epstein, supra note 6, at 433–34.  There were “only 265 lawsuits filed under 
the Rehabilitation Act from 1973–1990.”  Id.  After the ADA went into effect, approx-
imately 30,000 charges were filed in the first two years, and approximately one-quarter 
of those involved reasonable accommodation issues.  Id. at 434.  Epstein argues that 
8
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some of the confusion derives from the fact that some of the Section 504 Re-
habilitation Act cases are not employment cases,64 so the application of the 
undue hardship factors does not translate as well to employment cases.65  The 
other problem is that these cases involve large public, or quasi-public, employ-
ers whose budgets were comprised in large part of revenue collected from tax-
payers.  Gleaning anything from these cases when applied to private employers 
is difficult.66  Thus, the question remains whether these cases actually helped 
clarify the standard.  The answer, I am afraid, is “not much.” 
In one of the most frequently cited cases under the Rehabilitation Act, 
Nelson v. Thornburgh,67 three blind income maintenance workers with Penn-
sylvania’s Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) requested their employer to 
provide them readers to allow them to perform their jobs.68  Because their jobs 
entailed extensive paperwork, they had to use readers on a part-time basis.69  
The plaintiffs had originally hired and paid for the readers themselves.70  But 
in their lawsuit, they claimed that the defendant’s refusal to accommodate them 
by providing readers or some other mechanical device to allow them to read 
was discrimination within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act.71  The defendant argued that the cost of the readers or mechanical devices 
would be an undue hardship.72  In exploring the cost of the readers, the court 
noted that the provision of a full-time reader is not necessary because the work-
ers could conduct the determination and redetermination interviews without the 
reader and then use the reader to prepare the forms required.73  Thus, a reader 
was only necessary for four hours per day or less.74  During the rest of the day, 
a person capable of serving as a reader could be on call.75  At the time, the type 
 
those 265 cases “could not possibly have provided a large enough database to suffi-
ciently clarify an issue” that is litigated much more under the ADA, especially consid-
ering that only a handful of the cases addressed whether an accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship and only two focused on financial costs.  Id. 
 64. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to all programs or activities re-
ceiving federal financial assistance.  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018). 
 65. See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982) (addressing 
undue hardship in a case regarding public transit); Am. Pub. Transit Ass’n v. Lewis, 
655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dealing with the issue of whether the Department of 
Transportation regulations implementing Section 504 in the public transit context were 
valid); R.I. Handicapped Action Comm. v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 549 F. Supp. 592 
(D.R.I. 1982) (addressing undue hardship in a case regarding public transit), rev’d in 
part, vacated in part 718 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 66. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 437–39. 
 67. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 68. Id. at 370. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 370–71. 
 72. Id. at 371. 
 73. Id. at 376. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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of clerk that performed the job as a reader earned $13,276 per year.76  The court 
reasoned that because the plaintiffs could perform the essential functions of 
their job if they were each supplied with a half-time reader, the cost of accom-
modation would be approximately half of the salary of the clerk, or $6,638 per 
year, for each plaintiff.77 
In determining whether this accommodation constituted an undue hard-
ship for the defendant, the court reviewed the factors promulgated in the im-
plementing regulations for the Rehabilitation Act.  Those factors are very sim-
ilar to the factors we currently have under the ADA: “(1) the overall size of the 
recipient’s program with respect to number of employees, number and type of 
facilities, and size of budget; (2) the type of the recipient’s operation, including 
the composition and structure of the recipient’s workforce; and (3) the nature 
and cost of the accommodation needed.”78  The court also cited to the illustra-
tions in the Appendix to the regulations: 
The weight given to each of these factors in making the determination 
as to whether an accommodation constitutes undue hardship will vary 
depending on the facts of a particular situation.  Thus, a small day-care 
center might not be required to expend more than a nominal sum, such 
as that necessary to equip a telephone for use by a secretary with im-
paired hearing, but a large school district might be required to make 
available a teacher’s aide to a blind applicant for a teaching job.  Fur-
ther, it might be considered reasonable to require a state welfare agency 
to accommodate a deaf employee by providing an interpreter while it 
would constitute an undue hardship to impose that requirement on a 
provider of foster home care services.79 
Applying these regulations, the court held, in light of the defendant’s 
$300 million administrative budget, the “modest cost of providing half-time 
readers, and the ease of adopting that accommodation without any disruption 
of DPW’s services, [makes] it . . . apparent that DPW has not met its burden of 
showing undue hardship.”80  This case is frequently cited as one where the rel-
atively significant costs of accommodation did not cause an undue hardship.81 
In Arneson v. Sullivan,82 the plaintiff was an employee at a social security 
administration (“SSA”) office.  He had a neurological disorder called apraxia 
that caused him difficulty bringing ideas together and writing; he was easily 
distracted, and he had difficulty with some motor skills.83  He especially had 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 379–80 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)(1-3)). 
 79. Id. at 380 (quoting 45 C.F.R app. § 84). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See e.g., William S. Colwell, Accommodating the Handicapped Federal Em-
ployee, 35 A.F. L. REV. 69, 77–78 (1991). 
 82. 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 83. Id. at 91. 
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trouble concentrating in noisy, stressful environments.84  He performed satis-
factorily in one location, where he had a semi-private office space, but once he 
was transferred to a different location, he began to have trouble performing.85  
The employer terminated him for alleged performance difficulties.86  Arneson 
sued, and in his lawsuit he argued that he could have performed his job ade-
quately with the following accommodations: “(1) a telephone headset to free 
his hands; (2) a quiet workspace to minimize his distractibility; and (3) clerical 
assistance to check his work.”87  Although the employer agreed to the first re-
quest, it claimed it could not find him a quiet workspace and that providing 
clerical assistance would mean it would have to hire another employee capable 
of doing his job, which would be the equivalent of hiring two people to perform 
one job.88  The employer argued that these accommodations were not reasona-
ble and would cause an undue hardship, and the district court agreed.89 
In the first opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
the court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the employer had 
offered the plaintiff reasonable accommodations and that the plaintiff was not 
qualified.90  The court stated that the district court had not given enough atten-
tion to the possibility of transferring plaintiff back to his original location 
where he had a semi-private workspace or providing him some clerical assis-
tance.91  The court stated that it did not appear that these options were ade-
quately examined in an effort to determine the cost of such accommodations 
and the impact they would have on the employer’s operation.92  As the court 
stated: 
[F]urther development is necessary to ascertain what duties this assis-
tant would have to perform in order to have some impact on Arneson’s 
job performance, what the cost of such an assistant would be and 
whether additional funding may be available to offset the cost to the 
SSA.  Obviously, it is beyond the expectations of the Rehabilitation Act 
that the SSA be required to hire another person capable of actually per-
forming Arneson’s job.  On the other hand, Arneson claims that he 
would only need someone to proofread his work and that this person 
would only need to know how to read.  And, presumably, the necessary 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1989), remanded No. 84–
2552–C(3), 1990 WL 116658 (E.D. Mo. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 87. Id. at 397. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 397–98. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 397. 
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proofreading could be accomplished by a part-time worker, such as a 
college student.93 
The court also stated: “We strongly feel that the federal government 
should be a model employer of the handicapped and should be required to make 
whatever reasonable accommodations are available.”94  The court remanded 
the case back to the district court, and the district court again rendered judg-
ment for the defendant.95 
In the Eighth Circuit’s second opinion, the court again reversed the dis-
trict court, concluding that Arneson was qualified and that the SSA refused to 
make reasonable accommodations as required by law.96  Specifically, the court 
noted that “very little was done to attempt to accommodate Arneson and to, 
thus, preserve him as a contributing employee of the SSA.”97  The court further 
noted that Arneson was “on disability, receiving a government pension when 
he c[ould] very likely adequately perform services as a social security claims 
representative.”98  The court also noted that the duties of the claim representa-
tive had by then been automated, thus negating the need for a clerical assis-
tant.99  With regard to the distraction-reduced workspace, the court noted that 
the SSA never looked into providing a private work space at the new location 
and that no one had demonstrated how much it would cost.100  Thus, the court 
reversed the district court and remanded, directing the district court to enter an 
order reinstating Arneson, giving him computer training on the new system, 
and requiring the department to spend a reasonable amount to provide him a 
distraction-free environment.101  The court also awarded back pay.102  Perhaps 
surprisingly, the court also directed that, if necessary, Arneson be given a 
“reader.”103  The court noted that this did not need to be someone “who [wa]s 
an alternate claims representative, only an individual who, upon reading the 
paper printed by the computer at the work station, c[ould] assist Arneson in his 
efforts to satisfactorily complete his assigned tasks.”104 
The above cases are ones where the court set a fairly high bar for the 
employer to prove undue hardship.  But there were other Rehabilitation Act 
 
 93. Id. at 397–98. 
 94. Id. at 398. 
 95. Id.; Arneson v. Heckler, No. 84–2552–C(3), 1990 WL 116658, at *6 (E.D. 
Mo. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th 
Cir. 1991). 
 96. Id. at 91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 92. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 92–93. 
 103. Id. at 93. 
 104. Id. 
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cases where the courts did not require expensive, burdensome accommoda-
tions.  For instance, in Gardner v. Morris,105 the plaintiff was a civil engineer 
with the United States Army Corps of Engineers ( “Corps”) and was diagnosed 
as a manic depressive.106  His application for promotion and transfer to Saudi 
Arabia was rejected because the “medical facilities in Saudi Arabia were not 
capable of accommodating the plaintiff’s condition” and the “nearest compe-
tent physician was a one-hour flight, or a thirteen-hour drive[,] away.”107  The 
court concluded that the only accommodation would have been for the Corps 
to set up a medical facility in Saudi Arabia sufficient to treat the plaintiff’s 
condition and that this accommodation would impose an undue hardship.108 
Similarly, in Treadwell v. Alexander, the plaintiff, a retired Air Force 
colonel, applied with the Corps as a seasonal park technician.109  He had been 
previously rated by the Veteran’s Administration as 100% disabled due to a 
nervous condition and a heart condition and was denied the position because 
the Corps believed he was not qualified due to his disabilities.110  The district 
court concluded that it would have been necessary for the Corps to require other 
park technicians to perform many of the plaintiff’s duties if he had been 
hired.111  The appellate court stated that because “only two to four other work-
ers [were] available at any given time to patrol the 150,000 acres [of the park,] 
and in light of the agency’s limited resources,” requiring other workers to per-
form some of plaintiff’s duties would impose an “undue hardship” on the 
Corps.112  The appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendant 
had established its undue hardship defense.113 
III. UNDUE HARDSHIP CASES UNDER THE ADA 
Despite the concern expressed in early scholarship that the vagueness of 
the undue hardship provision would lead to a great deal of litigation, the reality 
is that the undue hardship defense is very rarely outcome determinative.  This 
Part does not try to discuss or even cite to every undue hardship case under the 
ADA.  Instead, its goal is to categorize the cases based on the facts that are 
alleged to create an undue hardship. 
 
 105. 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 106. Epstein, supra note 6, at 419.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 707 F.2d 473, 474 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 478. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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A. The Early Cases 
There were three cases decided in the early days of the ADA that provided 
some guidance on the undue hardship provision but mostly discussed the bur-
dens of proof and the relationship between the undue hardship defense and the 
reasonable accommodation provision.  Even though none of these cases spe-
cifically discussed the issue of “how much is too much,” they do provide some 
guidance on what early courts were thinking with respect to the undue hardship 
defense. 
The first and one of the most-cited ADA cases is Vande Zande v. Wiscon-
sin Department of Administration.114  This case is most known for its statement 
regarding how to determine whether an accommodation is “reasonable”—by 
using a cost-benefit approach.115  The court stated: 
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace 
to enable a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, 
or even that an accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable 
if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly.  But at the very least, 
the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit.116 
The court’s reasoning for so defining the reasonable accommodation pro-
vision was its concern that the undue hardship provision would make it difficult 
for an employer to raise a cost-based defense to an accommodation, especially 
if the employer is large or, like the employer in Vande Zande, a government 
employer.117  The court stated: 
Even if an employer is so large or wealthy—or, like the principal de-
fendant in this case, is a state, which can raise taxes in order to finance 
any accommodations that it must make to disabled employees—that it 
may not be able to plead “undue hardship,” it would not be required to 
expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in 
the life of a disabled employee.  If the nation’s employers have poten-
tially unlimited financial obligations to [forty-three] million disabled 
persons, the [ADA] will have imposed an indirect tax potentially greater 
 
 114. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).  Westlaw reveals that, as of December 26, 2018, 
there are 2,594 citing references to this case.  This opinion was authored by well-known 
Judge Posner, and Judge Easterbrook was also on the panel.  I am certain that this con-
tributed to the case’s popularity. 
 115. Id. at 542 (stating that the word “reasonable” weakens the word “accommoda-
tion” “in just the same way that if one requires a ‘reasonable effort’ of someone this 
means less than the maximum possible effort”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 542–43. 
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than the national debt.  We do not find an intention to bring about such 
a radical result in either the language of the A[DA] or its history.118 
Then, in trying to determine how to define “undue hardship,” the court 
stated that undue hardship is a term of relation: “We must ask, ‘undue’ in rela-
tion to what?  Presumably (given the statutory definition and the legislative 
history) in relation to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker 
as well as to the employer’s resources.”119  Thus, putting this all together, the 
court stated that costs should be considered at two points in the reasonable ac-
commodation analysis.120  According to the court, the “employee must show 
that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense” that it is both effective and 
proportional to costs.121  Even if this showing is made, “the employer has an 
opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration the costs are exces-
sive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s 
financial survival or health.”122 
Applying its cost-benefit approach to one of the accommodations re-
quested, which was a lower sink in the kitchenette so that the plaintiff (who 
was a paraplegic) could reach it from her wheelchair, the court stated that even 
though it would have cost only $150 to lower the sink, given the proximity of 
the bathroom sink, 
we do not think an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts 
of money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions be-
tween disabled and nondisabled workers.  The creation of such a duty 
would be the inevitable consequence of deeming a failure to achieve 
identical conditions “stigmatizing.”  That is merely an epithet.  We con-
clude that access to a particular sink, when access to an equivalent sink, 
conveniently located, is provided, is not a legal duty of an employer.  
The duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the employer 
does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reason-
able comfort.123 
The second case (chronologically) is actually a case brought under the 
Rehabilitation Act, but it was decided in 1995, shortly after the ADA went into 
effect, and it is frequently cited in other ADA reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship cases.124  In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,125 the 
 
 118. Id. (alteration in original). 
 119. Id. at 543. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F. 3d 363, 370–71 (2d Cir. 
2008); Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Labor, 205 F. 3d 562, 566–67 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 125. 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995).   
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plaintiff was a library teacher who served at two elementary schools.  In addi-
tion to her duties in the library, “she was responsible for teaching library skills 
to classes of elementary school students.”126  She suffered major head trauma 
and serious neurological damage, which caused difficulties with memory and 
concentration, and she had trouble dealing with simultaneous stimuli.127  An 
unannounced visit to one of her classes found her having difficulty controlling 
the class—“students had talked, yelled, and whistled without being cor-
rected.”128  The school district denied her tenure.129 
The court was tasked with determining the appropriate burdens of proof 
when deciding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship issues.  The 
court held that the plaintiff bears the burden of production and persuasion on 
the issue of whether she is qualified for the job in question, which includes 
whether there is an accommodation that would permit her to perform the job’s 
essential functions.130  As for how costs come into play, the court held that “an 
accommodation is only reasonable if its costs are not clearly disproportionate 
to the benefits it will produce.”131  Plaintiff’s burden with respect to reasonable 
accommodation is one of production—she must “suggest the existence of a 
plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed 
its benefits.”132  Then the defendant has the burden of showing that the accom-
modation is unreasonable and that burden merges with its ultimate burden of 
showing that the accommodation would cause an undue hardship.133 
The court then undertook a more specific undue hardship analysis, at-
tempting to analyze the undue hardship factors.134  But the court stated that the 
factors do not tell us much because certainly “Congress could not have in-
tended that the only limit on the employer’s duty to make reasonable accom-
modation to be the full extent of the tax base on which the government entity 
c[an] draw.”135  Thus, the court stated that undue hardship is a relational term, 
where we have to look at not only the costs to the employer but also the benefits 
to others that will result.136  However, the court also stated that there is no 
complex formula and instead courts should undertake a common-sense balanc-
ing of the costs and benefits.137 
The way I read this language is that the court in Borkowski is intimating 
that the obligation to provide an accommodation is not very great or significant.  
But in deciding the issue of whether the plaintiff should be allowed a teacher’s 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 137–38. 
 131. Id. at 138. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 139. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 138. 
 137. Id. at 140. 
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aide to assist her in managing the classroom as a reasonable accommodation, 
the court stated there was not enough evidence of undue hardship to decide the 
issue on summary judgment.138  Specifically, the court stated that the school 
district did not present evidence concerning the cost of providing a teacher’s 
aide or the school district’s budget, among other things.139  The court also noted 
that the regulations to the Rehabilitation Act contemplate that employers might 
be required to assume the cost of providing an aide absent a showing that the 
cost is excessive in light of the factors.140 
The third case is a district court case, which is included here because it 
was an early case that involved a significant discussion about the meaning of 
the undue hardship provision.141  In Bryant v. Better Business Bureau [“BBB”] 
of Greater Maryland, Inc., the plaintiff suffered from some (but not complete) 
hearing loss.142  She requested and received a transfer to the membership coor-
dinator position from the administrative position she had been serving in at 
BBB.143  As part of that new job, she had to staff a hotline number and had 
difficulty hearing the addresses and telephone numbers of the callers with the 
amplification device she was accustomed to using.144  She requested a text tel-
ephone (“TTY”) device that would allow her to communicate by way of an 
operator typing the conversation of the caller and then Bryant simply speaking 
back to the caller (she had no difficulty with speech).145  The cost of the TTY 
device was a one-time expense of $279.146  BBB denied her request, stating 
that it would cause an undue hardship.147 
The court’s analysis of the undue hardship defense was a bit different 
from other courts.  The court first noted that several courts “have treated ‘rea-
sonable accommodations’ and ‘undue hardship’ as flip sides of the same coin,” 
meaning that an accommodation that is reasonable would not cause an undue 
hardship and an accommodation that is unreasonable would cause an undue 
hardship.148  But as the court noted, “several courts have held . . . that an ac-
commodation could be ‘reasonable’ and still cause an ‘undue hardship.’”149  
The court agreed with these latter courts and argued that material differences 
exist between inquiries about whether an accommodation is reasonable and 
whether the accommodation would cause an excessive or undue hardship on 
 
 138. Id. at 142–43. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 142. 
 141. In full disclosure, I also chose this case for the disability law casebook that I 
co-authored with Steve Befort.  See BEFORT & PORTER, supra note 14, at 187. 
 142. Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 727 (D. 
Md. 1996). 
 143. Id. at 730. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 730. 
 147. Id. at 731. 
 148. Id. at 733.  See infra Section IV.A for a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
 149. Id. at 734. 
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the employer.150  Thus, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are not, 
according to the court in Bryant, flip sides of the same coin.151 
Instead, the reasonable accommodation inquiry asks whether the accom-
modation would be effective and would allow the employee to attain an equal 
level of achievement, opportunity, and participation that a nondisabled individ-
ual would be able to achieve.152  The undue hardship defense focuses on the 
impact that the accommodation would have on the specific employer at a par-
ticular time.153  This is, according to the court, “a multi-faceted, fact-sensitive 
inquiry requiring consideration of: (1) financial cost; (2) additional administra-
tive burdens; (3) complexity of implementation; and (4) any negative impact 
that the accommodation may have on the operation of the business, including 
the effect of the accommodation on the employer’s workforce.”154 
BBB argued that it had denied the TTY device based on a determination 
that it “‘would slow down the operation of’ the membership coordinator.”155  
The employer argued it was worried about the volume of calls it would receive 
if it implemented a 900 number as planned.156  But when pressed at his depo-
sition, the supervisor said that cost was not a factor; instead, he testified that it 
was not the speed with which she could handle the calls; it was the accuracy.157  
The employer also provided the testimony of an expert witness who testified 
that “BBB’s members’ awkwardness and unfamiliarity with the system would 
cause the members who called BBB ‘an undue hardship.’”158 
The court stated that these reasons did not comport with the statutory and 
regulatory scheme of the ADA.  The argument that the TTY device would have 
slowed down the plaintiff focused on the reasonableness of the accommoda-
tion, not the burden on the employer.159  The court also stated that the defend-
ant’s argument of imagined awkwardness and unfamiliarity of BBB’s members 
with the system was “not only inappropriate and patronizing but offensive.”160  
Even assuming that the system was “awkward and unfamiliar,” the court noted 
that no suggestion had been made as to how that would have negatively af-
fected the business.161  The court held that the defendant’s assumption of an 
adverse impact on the business was based on “little more than preconceived 
 
 150. Id. at 736. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 737. 
 155. Id. at 738. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 738. 
 158. Id. at 739. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 740. 
 161. Id. 
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discriminatory stereotypes, which are the targets of the ADA in the first 
place.”162  Thus, the defendant’s undue hardship argument failed.163 
Although these cases help us understand the burdens of proof in reasona-
ble accommodation cases, they do little to give us a sense of predicting the cost 
question: How much is too much?  Cases decided after these early cases do not 
shed too much light on the subject but are still worth analyzing. 
B. Cases Where Financial Cost Was an Issue 
Of all the undue hardship cases I identified and read, only sixteen of them 
actually discussed costs.164  And in one of these cases, the undue hardship anal-
ysis was dicta because the case could have been decided on other grounds.  In 
Balls v. AT&T Corp., the plaintiff had carpal tunnel syndrome, and her job 
required typing at least forty-five words per minute; but according to the plain-
tiff, often typing seventy to eighty words per minute was necessary.165  The 
accommodation she requested was to use voice-activated technology instead 
of typing.166  Because the evidence revealed that voice-activated technology 
would cost twelve million dollars, the court held that it would be an undue 
hardship.167  Despite its undue hardship discussion, the court also held that the 
plaintiff did not have a disability, which justified dismissing the plaintiff’s 
case.168 
Even when courts hold that the employer did not prove undue hardship, 
the procedural posture of these cases is such that the plaintiffs are not winning 
their claims—they are simply surviving to litigate another day, i.e., surviving 
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.  In most of the cases, the court 
simply stated that the defendant had not provided enough information to sup-
port the undue hardship defense.169 
 
 162. Id. at 740. 
 163. Id. at 741. 
 164. As mentioned earlier, I identified 1,997 cases that mentioned “undue hardship” 
in the context of an ADA case.  See supra note 16.  However, of those, I identified only 
about 120 of them that actually engaged in an undue hardship discussion (rather than 
simply citing the statutory language).  See supra note 17. 
 165. 28 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 166. Id. at 973–74. 
 167. Id. at 974. 
 168. Id. at 974–75. 
 169. See, e.g., Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondoga, 369 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 
2004) (holding that the employer had not proven that the costs of accommodating the 
plaintiff’s scheduling needs causes an undue burden because the defendant presented 
no evidence of the financial impact of the accommodation, including no evidence of 
their financial resources or the costs of the accommodation); Reilly v. Upper Darby 
Twp., 809 F. Supp. 2d 368, 383–84 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (stating that the question of whether 
the cost the police department would incur from allowing the plaintiff to perform non-
patrol duties would pose an undue hardship is a question for the jury). 
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For instance, in Alabi v. Atlanta Public Schools, the plaintiff was a school 
teacher with a hearing disability.170  He requested a full-time interpreter to com-
municate in the classroom.171  The employer argued that this would cost too 
much money because the teacher needed a very skilled sign language inter-
preter (presumably because of the subject matter).172  The employer cited the 
cost of the interpreter as being $62 per hour or $85,000 for the school year, 
which it claimed would be an undue financial hardship, especially given that 
the cost was disproportionate to the plaintiff’s yearly salary of $53,000.173  The 
court recognized that the cost seemed high but ultimately held that the defend-
ant did not produce sufficient evidence to establish undue hardship.174  The 
court reasoned that there was no evidence the school district had attempted to 
negotiate this rate or see if it could reassign another interpreter from within the 
school district.175  The employer also lacked evidence of the impact of the po-
tential translation fees on the school district’s fiscal operation or resources.176 
In another sign language interpreter case, Searls v. Johns Hopkins Hospi-
tal, the plaintiff was a deaf woman with a nursing degree.177  When she was 
offered a nursing job, she requested an interpreter.178  The evidence revealed 
that the cost of providing an interpreter proficient in medical terminology 
would be between $40,000 and $60,000 and that she would require two inter-
preters with her at all times for an annual cost of $240,000.179  The hospital 
ultimately determined that it was too expensive to accommodate her and re-
scinded her offer.180  When the court discussed the employer’s undue hardship 
defense, it noted that the defendant had only focused on the resources and op-
erations of the specific unit for which she would be hired, ignoring the question 
of how providing an interpreter costing $120,000, or 0.007% of the entire op-
erational budget of $1.7 billion, could impose an undue hardship.181  The em-
ployer was basically arguing that it had no money in the budget allocated for 
reasonable accommodations.  The court (sensibly in my opinion) held that the 
employer’s budget for reasonable accommodations is an irrelevant factor in 
assessing undue hardship because allowing an employer to prevail on its undue 
hardship defense based on its own budgeting decisions would effectively cede 
 
 170. No. 1:12–CV–0191–AT, 2011 WL 11785485, *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011). 
 171. Id. at *2. 
 172. Id. at *3. 
 173. Id. at *6–8. 
 174. Id. at *10. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. 158 F. Supp. 3d 427, 430 (D. Md. 2016). 
 178. Id. at 431. 
 179. Id.  It is not clear why she would need two interpreters with her at all times, 
and even if she does, it is not clear how the defendant arrived at the $240,000 figure.  
The court used the figure of $120,000.  Id. at 438. 
 180. Id. at 433. 
 181. Id. at 438. 
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the legal determination on this issue to the employer.182  Finally, the court 
stated that it is irrelevant that the cost of the interpreter would be twice the 
salary of the plaintiff.183 
The size and financial resources of the employer was very relevant in 
these cases.  While the court was not willing in the above case (Searls) to find 
an undue hardship for a full-time interpreter, in another case involving a non-
profit organization, the court stated that it was an issue of fact regarding 
whether a sign language interpreter for all staff meetings (but presumably not 
the rest of the time) was an undue hardship.184 
In Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, the court also held 
that the question of undue hardship is a question of fact for the jury.185  This 
case involved the issue of whether the defendant violated the ADA by discrim-
inating in the provision of health benefits.186  The plaintiff had cancer and was 
diagnosed with AIDS.187  Accordingly, the cost of the employer’s health insur-
ance plan increased.188  Because of these increased costs, the employer 
switched to a new insurance company that refused to cover the plaintiff.189  In 
discussing the undue hardship issue, the court stated: 
The ADA explicitly recognizes that integrating disabled individuals 
into the workforce often will result in increased costs.  Increased costs 
are thought to be the price we as a people must pay for equal dignity.  
There comes a point, however, where enormous expense involved in 
providing equal terms of employment to an otherwise qualified individ-
ual may result in an undue burden for a covered entity.  The ADA takes 
account of these rare situations where an accommodation may be finan-
cially crippling . . . .190 
In the context of health insurance, the court pointed to the EEOC guide-
lines, which “state that an [e]mployer must prove that coverage for a discrete 
group of disabilities would be so expensive as to cause the employer’s plan to 
become financially insolvent.  The employer must also [demonstrate] that there 
is no alternative that would avoid the insolvency.” 191  Thus, the court denied 
 
 182. Id. at 438–39. 
 183. Id. at 439. 
 184. EEOC v. Placer ARC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1053, 1058–59 (E.D. Cal. 2015) 
(finding that the extent to which an interpreter is needed and the costs of providing one 
were speculative). 
 185. 924 F. Supp. 763, 781 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
 186. Id. at 768. 
 187. Id. at 769. 
 188. Id. at 871. 
 189. Id. at 770. 
 190. Id. at 780. 
 191. Id. at 781. 
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the employer’s motion for summary judgment, claiming this issue was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.192 
Similarly, in Kane v. Carmel Central School District, the plaintiff was a 
middle school music teacher who had multiple sclerosis, which required her to 
use a wheelchair.193  The defendant school district provided some accommo-
dations to her but refused others, claiming the cost was too high.194  For in-
stance, the defendant estimated that installing a power-assist door and con-
structing a ramp would be $20,000 and $30,000.195  The court criticized the 
defendant for not researching the costs of any of these accommodations and for 
not considering anything but the cost.196  For instance, the school district did 
not consider its overall budget, whether the budget could accommodate this 
request, or the overall benefits of providing the accommodations.197  Thus, the 
court held that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s pro-
posed accommodations would cause an undue hardship.198 
In some cases, the cost seemed pretty low and yet the employer still ar-
gued undue hardship.  For instance, in McGregor v. United Healthcare Ser-
vices, Inc., the court rejected the employer’s undue hardship argument and held 
that the $2,375 that it would cost to install an automatic door opener for the 
plaintiff, whose used a wheelchair, was not an undue burden.199  In another 
case, the court held that providing a sign language interpreter for one meeting 
where the plaintiff (who was deaf) was being investigated for theft did not 
cause an undue hardship because the benefit of having the interpreter out-
weighed the limited costs.200 
Sometimes courts do not have the opportunity to analyze the “how much 
is too much” question because the parties are disputing what the costs actually 
are.  For instance, in Garza v. Abbott Laboratories, the parties disputed the cost 
of the voice-activated software that the plaintiff needed to perform her duties 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. No. 12 CV 5429(VB), 2014 WL 7389438, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2014). 
 194. Id. at *2–3. 
 195. Id. at *2. 
 196. Id. at *7. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at *8; cf. Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F. Supp. 2d 485, 507–08 
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that UPS claimed undue hardship for the cost of having to 
search for a position that the plaintiff could perform with his disability related re-
strictions but did not submit evidence of its overall financial resources in order to allow 
a meaningful consideration of the undue hardship defense). 
 199. No. H–09–2340, 2010 WL 3082293, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2010). 
 200. Mohamed v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 141, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  This 
case was unusual because the hotel employed about fifty deaf employees, receiving 
substantial tax advantages for doing so, and therefore the defendant was accustomed to 
having interpreters on staff.  See id. at 146.  The problem in this case was that there was 
no interpreter for the first investigatory meeting after they accused the plaintiff of steal-
ing, and this caused the plaintiff to be unable to adequately defend himself against the 
theft accusation.  Id. at 151. 
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after an arm condition restricted her ability to comfortably type on a key-
board.201  The employer’s estimate for providing that software was $1 million 
as well as additional costs for significant programming to get the software to 
work.202  However, the plaintiff’s expert estimated the cost at $9,500.203  One 
interesting issue that arose was that the employer tried to argue that as long as 
it made its cost “estimate in good faith, it does not matter whether the estimate 
was objectively wrong.”204  The court, however, disagreed with the employer, 
stating that the undue hardship inquiry is an objective one and that because 
there was a dispute over the costs, it should be a fact issue for the jury.205 
Similarly, in Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, the county-employer 
opened a new call center that used software that was inaccessible for blind em-
ployees.206   Thus, because the plaintiff was blind, the employer did not transfer 
her to the new call center with her sighted coworkers.207  The estimates of the 
cost to make this software accessible varied widely from $129,600 to 
$648,000.208  The court compared this to the county’s total budget of $3.73 
billion per year and to the call center’s budget of $4 million per year.209  The 
court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, 
stating that the district court had improperly weighed conflicting evidence and 
did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.210  Similar 
to the Searls case discussed above, the court also disagreed with the district 
court’s reliance on the fact that the county’s budget had only a $15,000 line 
item for accommodations.211  The court stated: 
Allowing the County to prevail on its undue hardship defense based on 
its own budgeting decisions would effectively cede the legal determi-
nation on this issue to the employer that allegedly failed to accommo-
date an employee with a disability.  Taken to its logical extreme, the 
employer could budget $0 for reasonable accommodations and thereby 
always avoid liability.  The County’s overall budget ($3.73 billion in 
fiscal year 2010) and [the call center’s] operating budget (about $4 mil-
lion) are relevant factors.  But the County’s line-item budget for reason-
able accommodations is not.212 
 
 201. 940 F. Supp. 1227, 1229–31 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 202. Id. at 1240. 
 203. Id. at 1241. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1243. 
 206. 789 F.3d 407, 409 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 412. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 417. 
 211. Id. at 418. 
 212. Id. at 418 (citations omitted).  The court also stated that costs cannot be viewed 
in isolation; it is the relative costs that should be considered.  Id. 
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Interestingly, of the sixteen cases I identified where the court based its 
decision on costs, only one granted an employer’s motion for summary judg-
ment based on the undue hardship defense.  In D’Eredita v. ITT Corp., the 
plaintiff worked in a commercial facility and “committed numerous fabrication 
errors that led to an extensive disciplinary record” before he was diagnosed 
with mild dyslexia.213  His job required him to read designs and use scales, 
gauges, and similar instruments.214  He had difficulty with all of these tasks, 
causing him to be laid off and unable to successfully bid on another job.215  The 
two accommodations he requested were to have additional employees added to 
his line and to have the motors he used color coded.216  The court held that both 
accommodations would unduly burden the employer.217  The first accommo-
dation, involving extra employees, would cause the employer to assume super-
fluous labor expense, which would interfere with the employer’s desired profit 
margins.218  The second accommodation would also impose an undue hardship 
on the employer because color coordinating the manufacturing process would 
involve fifty different types of complex motors of varying types, which would 
be unduly burdensome and expensive.219  Interestingly, however, the employer 
never identified the specific costs, and unlike other cases, the court did not 
require the employer to identify the specific costs.220 
Despite this last case, my take-away from this group of cases is as follows: 
When the issue is truly one of direct costs (as opposed to indirect costs of ad-
ditional supervision or restructuring job tasks, etc.), courts seem to be willing 
to carefully analyze the undue hardship factors in the statute and require the 
employer to prove why the accommodation would be costly enough to reach 
that relatively high bar for proving undue hardship. 
C. Restructuring Job Tasks 
The cases I have placed in this category generally did not reference costs 
at all.  Instead, these are cases where the plaintiff’s requested accommodation 
involved restructuring of job tasks and the employer argued undue hardship not 
because of the cost of the accommodation but because accommodating the 
plaintiff would be difficult or unworkable.  Similar to the category above, for 
some of these cases, the undue hardship issue was not dispositive because the 
court could have dismissed the case for some other reason (often because the 
 
 213. No. 11–CV–6575–CJS–MWP, 2015 WL 6801828, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2015). 
 214. Id. at *2. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at *8. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See id. 
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individual did not meet the statutory definition of disability).221  But for some 
of them, the employer’s failure to prove undue hardship was the reason the case 
was not dismissed, and the plaintiff’s claim survived the employer’s motion 
for summary judgment.222 
For instance, in Carmichael v. Verso Paper, LLC, the plaintiff had several 
work injuries that caused physical restrictions, including lifting limitations and 
limitations on the repetitive use of his arms.223  The employer argued that his 
requested accommodation, taking breaks when needed, was a hardship to the 
employer because it limited the plaintiff’s work capacity.224  The court stated 
that the employer had not proven why plaintiff’s position could not be modified 
to allow the plaintiff to take breaks when needed.225  The court noted that the 
employer presented no evidence that indicated the employees had to complete 
 
 221. See, e.g., EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 148–49 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating 
that eliminating the plaintiff’s medication dispensing duties after plaintiff tried to com-
mit suicide by overdosing on medications would alter the nature of the position in a 
way that would cause an undue hardship but also holding that the claim could have 
been dismissed for other reasons); O’Bryan v. State ex. rel. Dep’t. of Conservation & 
Nat. Res., No 3:04–CV–00482–RAM, 2006 WL 2711550, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 
2006) (holding that requiring the employer to hire and compensate two employees to 
perform one job when the plaintiff’s injury made it impossible for her to fulfill her main 
job duty of filing would be unreasonable and cause an undue hardship, but the court 
did not dismiss the claim because the employer did not consider whether it would have 
been an undue hardship to transfer the plaintiff); Wiggins v. Davita Tidewater, LLC, 
451 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798–99 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was not disa-
bled, but even if she was, her requested accommodation of avoiding all supervision that 
was critical or caused her stress was not reasonable and would impose an undue hard-
ship on the employer); Mertes v. Westfield Ford, 220 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909–10 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed accommodation of having his coworkers 
perform all of the tasks on his behalf that involved lifting more than ten pounds or 
repetitive arm motions would have caused an undue hardship but also holding that the 
plaintiff was not disabled). 
 222. Only one case in this category (out of twenty-two) involved an outright win 
for the plaintiff.  In Tobin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 553 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 
2009), the court affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff on his failure to accommodate 
claim.  Id. at 124.  The plaintiff was terminated from his job as a sales representative 
selling insurance policies after he had difficulty meeting his quotas due to his bipolar 
disorder.  Id. at 125.  His requested accommodation was “to assign[] him to manage a 
‘Mass Marketing’ account, . . . [which] is a group insurance program offered to busi-
nesses . . . in which employees [can] purchase insurance policies at a discount.”  Id. at 
127.  These accounts are valuable because the representative gets to meet with many 
potential clients at once, thereby making it easier for someone, like the plaintiff, whose 
disability makes it difficult for him to stay on track with several smaller clients.  Id. at 
127.  The court affirmed the jury verdict, stating that the jury had the opportunity to 
consider the employer’s undue hardship argument for refusing to assign the plaintiff to 
one of these accounts and ultimately disagreed with it.  Id. at 140–41. 
 223. 679 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (D. Me. 2010). 
 224. Id. at 130. 
 225. Id. 
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tasks within a specific time limit; therefore, the court held that there was a fact 
issue as to whether the plaintiff should have been given more time to complete 
some of the more strenuous tasks, which would have accounted for breaks to 
accommodate his tolerance level.226  Thus, there was a question of fact with 
respect to the undue hardship argument.227 
Similarly, in Hill v. Clayton County School District, the court reversed 
summary judgment for the defendant.228  The plaintiff was a bus driver for 
special needs students.229  The bus had no air conditioning, which caused the 
plaintiff, who had lung disease, to have difficulty breathing in the hot Atlanta, 
Georgia, weather.230  The school district argued that providing her an air-con-
ditioned bus would have caused it an undue hardship because it would upset 
its seniority system with respect to bus allocation.231  The court held that the 
school district did not provide any evidence to support its assertion of undue 
hardship.232 
In Jernigan v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was a 
service technician whose job duties included installing, repairing, and testing 
phone lines, cable, and internet.233  He had an on-the-job back injury that left 
him unable to lift more than fifteen pounds or climb poles.234  The court stated 
that it was a jury question whether the heavy lifting and climbing duties were 
essential functions, given that they comprised a very small percentage of his 
duties.235  The court held that, given that plaintiff’s supervisor testified that he 
did not believe that accommodating the plaintiff would cause an undue hard-
ship, the employer had not yet presented sufficient concrete evidence to prove 
undue burden.236  The court also stated that the purported unfairness of reas-
signing a minor portion of the duties of a disabled employee to other employees 
available to perform such duties does not make the accommodation unreason-
able as a matter of law.237 
One fairly progressive case is Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc.238  
In this case, the plaintiff had epilepsy and experienced seizures daily, which 
rendered her unable to drive.239  She worked for one of the defendant’s gasoline 
service stations, which was located six blocks from her home.240  She applied 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. 619 Fed. App’x 916, 916 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 917–18. 
 231. Id. at 918. 
 232. Id. at 922. 
 233. 17 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1324. 
 236. Id. at 1324–25. 
 237. Id. at 1324. 
 238. 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 239. Id. at 213. 
 240. Id. 
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to be promoted to assistant manager, but the employer refused to promote her 
because assistant managers had to take their stores’ receipts to the bank for 
deposit and the plaintiff could not drive.241  The employer refused all of her 
quite reasonable accommodation requests, referred to her letter requesting ac-
commodations as “slanderous,” and threatened legal action.242  The employer 
eventually offered her an assistant manager position at a location serviced by 
an armored car (thus negating the need to drive to the bank), but it was also in 
a bad area of town (and not close to her home).243  The district court held that 
this accommodation was a reasonable accommodation, and therefore the em-
ployer was not required to do more.244  The appellate court, however, disa-
greed, stating that “Congress intended that disabled persons have the same op-
portunities available to them as are available to nondisabled persons.”245  In 
response to the employer’s argument that accommodating the plaintiff by al-
lowing her to become assistant manager at her current store would cause an 
undue hardship, the court held that the employer had provided no evidence that 
the accommodations suggested by the plaintiff would create an undue hardship, 
especially in light of the fact that one of the plaintiff’s suggestions was that she 
pay for her own transportation to the bank.246 
In another appellate case, the plaintiff was a cashier at a Family Dollar 
store who suffered from degenerative osteoarthritis of her cervical and lumber 
spine, which created pain in her legs and back, making it difficult for her to sit 
or stand for long periods of time.247  She requested a stool to sit on as an ac-
commodation, which some of her supervisors allowed but others did not.248  
The court held that there was a factual dispute as to whether this accommoda-
tion would cause an undue hardship for the employer, stating that the defendant 
has not set forth specific facts of an undue hardship.249  The court stated: 
While the defendants allege that co-workers had complained about un-
fair treatment, given Talley’s and other workers’ testimony that she was 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 213–14. 
 243. Id. at 214. 
 244. Id. at 217.  The district court likely based its decision on the well-known rule 
that an employer does not have to provide an employee with her preferred accommo-
dation as long as the employer provides an accommodation that is effective.  See cases 
cited in Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 56, n.222 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, Martinizing]. 
 245. Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 218. 
 246. Id. at 221 (stating that it will be an uphill battle for the employer to prove that 
the accommodation would create any hardship at all). 
 247. Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1103 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
 248. Id. at 1103. 
 249. Id. at 1108. 
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able to perform her job adequately when using the stool, there is a gen-
uine issue of material fact as to whether this accommodation would 
have imposed an “undue hardship” on Family Dollar . . . .250 
Other cases where the court held that the defendant had not presented 
enough evidence to prove undue hardship at the motion for summary judgment 
stage included: Kacher v. Houston Community College System,251 Morse v. Jet-
blue Airways Corp.,252 Puckett v. Park Place Entertainment, Corp.,253 Rooney 
v. Sprague Energy Corp.,254 and Service v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.255 
The plaintiffs in the cases below were not as lucky; the courts found that 
the defendant had proven the undue hardship defense, and the courts granted 
the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.256  For instance, in Dey v. Mil-
waukee Forge, the plaintiff had work restrictions including bending, lifting, 
and repetitive motions after injuring his back at work and having back sur-
gery.257  His employer considered reassignment to another position, but the 
 
 250. Id. at 1108–09. 
 251. 974 F. Supp. 615, 622 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that the employer had not 
proven that providing the plaintiff with only classroom teaching duties and not clinical 
teaching duties after her liver transplant would be an undue hardship). 
 252. 941 F. Supp. 2d 274, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that allowing the plaintiff 
to work as an inflight supervisor, even though her back injury precluded her from fly-
ing, was not an undue hardship because the plaintiff had worked in this job for six 
months without being able to fly and that the defendant offered no evidence as to the 
statutory undue hardship factors to substantiate its claim that allowing the plaintiff to 
work as an in-flight supervisor would have been unduly burdensome, especially given 
that other flight attendants were happy to perform her inflight observation duties). 
 253. No. 3:03–CV–0327–ECRVPC, 2006 WL 696180, at *1, *7 (D. Nev., Mar. 15, 
2006) (holding that the employer’s reasons for not allowing the plaintiff (who was a 
cocktail waitress) to push a drink cart after her multiple sclerosis precluded her ability 
to carry trays did not amount to an undue hardship). 
 254. 483 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47, 59 (D. Me. 2007) (holding that the employer had not 
presented sufficient evidence to prove that accommodating the plaintiff’s macular de-
generation by not making him operate large equipment would cause an undue hard-
ship). 
 255. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the employer had 
not provided any evidence to demonstrate that providing the plaintiff (who had asthma) 
with a smoke-free work environment would have caused an undue hardship). 
 256. See, e.g., Frumusa v. Zweigle’s, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191–92 (W.D.N.Y. 
2010) (holding that moving the plaintiff’s office to the first floor after an ankle surgery 
caused her to be unable to climb steps was an undue hardship because the items needed 
for her job, including the filing cabinets and company safe, could not be moved to the 
first floor); Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ga. 
1995) (“Requiring a company to employ a person in a particular department while for-
bidding her supervisor from having any contact with her [because of her emotional 
disability] would be an undue burden on the employer.  Such a ludicrous notion would 
undermine the effectiveness and authority of management.  Therefore, the court dis-
missed plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 257. 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1047–48 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
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court held that there was no position that could have been modified enough for 
the plaintiff to be able to perform the functions.258  The court stated that real-
location of job duties requiring other employees to perform them would cause 
those employees to be unable to perform their own duties and would result in 
an undue hardship on the employer’s business.259 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., the plaintiff’s osteoarthritis in her 
knees made it difficult for her to walk without a cane or to stand for long peri-
ods of time, both of which were required of her job as a cashier for Rite Aid.260  
Her doctor requested that she be allowed to sit on a stool for half her shift.261  
Because Rite Aid operated on a lean staffing model, where employees were 
expected to stock and clean the store when there were no customers at the reg-
ister, the court stated that “having a cashier sit idly for half of her shift would 
necessarily cause productiv[it]y and morale issues.”262  In response to the 
EEOC’s argument that the defendant could absorb the costs of this accommo-
dation because it employs over 80,000 employees with over 4,700 stores, the 
court focused on the cost of the accommodation to the particular store where 
the plaintiff worked.263  The court stated that the plaintiff’s sitting accommo-
dation was “inconsistent with many of the essential functions of the cashier 
position” and would require the employer to pay the plaintiff for twice the 
hours that she actually worked while assigning many of her responsibilities to 
other employees.264  “As such, the accommodation met the definition of ‘undue 
hardship’ under the ADA.”265 
D. Structural Norms Cases 
By far, the most numerous of all of the undue hardship cases I read were 
cases involving modifications to the “structural norms” of the workplace.266  
The term “structural norms” refers to the hours, shifts, schedules, attendance 
requirements, and leave of absence policies—basically, when and where work 
is performed.267  The frequency of these issues is not surprising, given that 
 
 258. Id. at 1051–52. 
 259. Id. at 1053. 
 260. No. 1:10–cv–2816–JEC, 2012 WL 2726766, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 9, 2012). 
 261. Id. at *1. 
 262. Id. at *9. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at *10. 
 265. Id. 
 266. As mentioned, supra note 17, I read over 120 cases that discussed the undue 
hardship defense and fifty-three of them involved accommodations to the structural 
norms of the workplace. 
 267. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver Conundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of 
Structural Norms, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 963, 963 (2014); see also Porter, Backlash, 
supra note 8, at 70–71. 
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some studies indicate that the most frequently requested accommodation is an 
accommodation to one of these structural norms.268 
Several cases involved attendance violations.  In many of these cases, the 
court stated in rather a perfunctory manner that attendance is an essential func-
tion of the job and that requiring the employer to accommodate an employee’s 
disability-related erratic attendance would cause an undue hardship.269  There-
fore, I was surprised to see the court’s unprecedented discussion in this rela-
tively early ADA case.  In Dutton, the plaintiff worked as a laborer, truck 
driver, and heavy equipment operator, and he suffered from migraine head-
aches, which led to his termination for absenteeism.270  The plaintiff’s re-
quested accommodation was to allow him to use vacation time for unscheduled 
absences due to illness even if he had exhausted his available sick leave.271  The 
employer argued that this accommodation would be unreasonable and would 
impose an undue hardship on the employer, but the court disagreed and held 
that the employer had not proven that the plaintiff’s proposed accommodation 
would cause an undue hardship.272  The court reasoned that the employer had 
not established that regular and predictable attendance is critical to the plain-
tiff’s particular job and that the plaintiff had not exceeded his allowed leave 
banks.273  Thus, even though the unscheduled absences were disruptive for 
managers and other employees, the court held that the employer had not estab-
lished that the plaintiff’s unscheduled absences were unduly disruptive.274  This 
case was surprising to me for several reasons.  First, it was unusual for migraine 
headaches to have been considered a disability before the ADAAA.  Second, it 
is fairly uncommon for a court to say that regular and predictable attendance is 
not important.  And third, most courts would have said that the disruption 
caused by plaintiff’s frequent unscheduled absences (which often occurred on 
Mondays and Fridays) did cause an undue hardship. 
 
 268. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 
85, 88 (2016) (citing Lisa Schur et al., Accommodating Employees with and Without 
Disabilities, 53 HUM. RES. MGMT. 593, 601 (2014)). 
 269. See, e.g., Thomas v. Trane, A Bus. of Am. Standard, Inc., 2007 WL 2874776, 
at *8 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2007) (stating that plaintiff’s requested accommodation of a 
last minute excused absence whenever he needed time off for his disability would cause 
an undue hardship because it could potentially cause the assembly line to back up and 
increase overtime hours for other employees called to fill in); Lu Frahm v. Holy Family 
Hosp. of Estherville, Inc., No. C95–3011, 1996 WL 33423407, at *6–7 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 
30, 1996) (stating that attendance is an essential function of the job and that plaintiff’s 
proposed accommodation for flexible scheduling because of her severe migraines 
would impose an undue hardship on the employer). 
 270. Dutton v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 859 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D. Kan. 
1994). 
 271. Id. at 507. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 508. 
 274. Id. 
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In La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., another arguably plaintiff-friendly 
case, the court held that the plaintiff’s one-day absence to pursue in vitro ferti-
lization was a reasonable accommodation and that the employer’s undue hard-
ship defense was an issue of fact for the jury.275  The court stated that the em-
ployer’s arguments about the lack of substitute personnel and the need for pre-
dictable attendance are questions of fact for the jury.276 
On the opposite end of the spectrum is Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enter-
prise.277  In this case, the plaintiff was a route manager for a frozen food deliv-
ery company who was responsible for driving delivery trucks on sale routes 
and training other drivers.278  The court held that the employer’s refusal to ac-
commodate one of the plaintiff’s physical therapy appointments after a work-
related injury did not violate the ADA because accommodating this last minute 
request would have meant that the delivery route did not get completed, that an 
inexperienced driver had to complete the route alone, or that one of two avail-
able supervisors would have had to accommodate the trainee on the delivery 
run.279  The court held that all of these options would have caused an undue 
hardship on the defendants even though the employee was seeking only one 
absence as an accommodation.280 
As I have discussed elsewhere, it is understandable that an employer 
would not want “to continue to employ [someone] who misses an excessive 
amount of work.”281  In these situations, employees are usually looking for one 
of two accommodations—either the ability to work from home or a leave of 
absence in order to recover or get the symptoms of their disability under con-
trol.282 
Taking the latter first, at least twenty-two of these cases involved leaves 
of absence, with the courts regularly holding that an indefinite leave of absence 
would cause the employer an undue hardship283 but a leave of absence with a 
 
 275. 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762–63, 768 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
 276. Id. at 768. 
 277. 231 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 278. Id. at 676. 
 279. Id. at 686. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 76. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See, e.g., Alston v. Microsoft Corp., 851 F. Supp. 2d 725, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(stating that, even if plaintiff could establish his prima facie case, “requiring [the em-
ployer] to extend an indefinite leave of absence is an undue hardship”); Graves v. Finch 
Pruyn & Co., Inc., No. 1:03–CV–266, 2009 WL 819380, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 
2009) (holding that because the employer had offered various leave and light duty ac-
commodations for one year, and because there was “a lack of any prognosis that an 
additional two weeks of leave would lead to his reasonable return to work,” an undue 
hardship was created for the employer, and therefore the employer was not obligated 
to provide additional leave under the ADA); Whitaker v. Wis. Dep’t. of Health Serv., 
No. 13-cv-938, 2016 WL 3693766, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 2016) (holding that plain-
tiff’s failure to accommodate claim failed because continued medical leave was not a 
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set return date would not.284  Often, the courts held that there was an issue of 
fact regarding whether the leave was indefinite or not; therefore, the courts 
would not grant the employers’ motions for summary judgment.285  And some 
courts simply held that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrat-
ing that the leave of absence would cause an undue hardship.286  One case made 
 
reasonable accommodation in that “[n]o employer is required to implement an accom-
modation that would impose an undue hardship” and plaintiff’s leave request amounted 
to an open-ended leave, which would have a “substantial impact on the employer’s 
operation”); Ventura v. Hanitchak, 719 F. Supp. 2d 132, 140 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding 
that it was an undue hardship to require the employer to hold open plaintiff’s position 
as an executive assistant beyond the original seventeen weeks of leave, especially be-
cause it was uncertain when plaintiff would be able to return and her boss was dealing 
with problems caused by untrained, temporary employees); Watkins v. J&S Oil Co., 
Inc., 977 F. Supp. 520, 521–22, 526 (D. Me. 1997) (holding that the employer was not 
required to hold open the plaintiff’s job as a station manager while he was recovering 
from a heart attack because the plaintiff did not know when he would be able to return 
and it caused an undue hardship for the employer to leave the station manager position 
vacant). 
 284. See, e.g., Gibson v. Lafayette Manor, Inc., No. 05-1082, 2007 WL 951473, at 
*11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the plaintiff’s 
leave of absence would cause an undue hardship because the defendant did not present 
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff’s leave would have been for an indefinite period 
of time); Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 250 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
the employer’s undue hardship argument failed because the plaintiff’s leave could not 
fairly be characterized as indefinite and whether his six-week leave would cause an 
undue hardship was a question of fact for the jury). 
 285. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Brown & Brown of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 
2d 694, 701–02 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that it is a jury question whether plaintiff’s 
request for leave was an indefinite amount of leave); Moore v. Md. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Safety & Corr. Servs., No. 08–4335, 2011 WL 4101139, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2011) 
(holding that the issue of whether the plaintiff’s eight-month absence from her job to 
receive cancer treatment was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA or consti-
tuted an indefinite leave of absence that imposed an undue hardship was an issue of 
material fact); Shelton v. Bridgestone Metalpha, U.S.A., Inc., No. 3–11–0001, 2012 
WL 1609670, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 8, 2012) (holding that, because it was unclear 
whether plaintiff’s request for leave was indefinite or not, the court could not hold that 
the employer carried its burden of demonstrating an undue hardship). 
 286. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 Fed. App’x 74, 80 (6th Cir. 
2003) (stating that there was an issue of fact regarding whether providing plaintiff a 
leave of absence would cause an undue hardship); Coffman v. Robert J. Young Co., 
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 703 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (holding that the defendant did not prove 
that providing the plaintiff with an additional unpaid leave of absence would have 
caused it an undue hardship, despite the fact that defendant contended that her absence 
created a hardship because it had to find a replacement for her); Burress v. City of 
Franklin, 809 F. Supp. 2d 795, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (holding that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether granting additional leave time would have 
posed an undue burden on the City); Casteel v. Charter Commc’n Inc., No. C13–5520 
RJB, 2014 WL 5421258, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2014) (stating that there were 
issues of fact regarding whether extending plaintiff’s leave would impose an undue 
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a point that scholars often make—that it is more efficient to accommodate an 
employee’s leave of absence than to deal with the cost of attrition.287  On the 
other end of the spectrum, some courts held that what seemed like a relatively 
short leave of absence caused an undue hardship.288 
Another frequently requested accommodation when an employee’s disa-
bility prevents the employee from being physically present at work is to work 
from home.  Obviously, for some jobs, this is not a feasible accommodation—
particularly in the service, healthcare, or manufacturing industries.  When it is 
possible, some courts allowed the plaintiff’s claim to go forward, holding that 
working from home does not create an undue hardship as a matter of law.289  
 
hardship); Donelson v. Providence Health & Servs., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (E.D. 
Wa. 2011) (holding that there was an issue of fact regarding whether additional leave 
caused an undue hardship because it interfered with the employer’s goal of providing 
its residents with continuous and consistent care or whether the unpaid medical leave 
caused no financial harm); Fink v. Printed Circuit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (holding that, because the plaintiff’s duties might make it difficult to find 
a temporary replacement, there was an issue of fact as to whether accommodating his 
leave of absence request would cause an undue hardship); Harper v. Honda of Am. 
Mfg., Inc., No. C–2–97–0338, 1998 WL 1788072, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 1998) 
(stating that the undue hardship defense is a fact-intensive, case-by-case determination 
so the defendant could not argue that anything more than a twelve-month leave was an 
undue hardship); Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’n, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir. 
1998) (stating that the employer couold not allege undue hardship for providing a leave 
of absence to the plaintiff simply because the plaintiff’s duties had to be covered by his 
coworkers); Shim v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 11–00161 JMS–BMK2012 WL 
6742529, at *9–10 (D. Ha. Dec. 13, 2012) (holding that there was a material issue of 
fact regarding whether plaintiff’s unpaid leave created an undue hardship because there 
were questions of fact regarding (1) whether plaintiff was even in violation of the em-
ployer’s policy on leaves of absence and (2) whether an additional leave period would 
cause an undue hardship). 
 287. See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument on appeal from a jury trial in favor of the plaintiff that giving the plaintiff a 
leave of absence caused an undue hardship because a defense witness testified that dis-
ability leaves did not financially burden IBM in that it is always more profitable to 
allow an employee time to recover than to hire and train a new employee). 
 288. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 665, 671 
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff, who had a mental illness, was not entitled to 
continued leave beyond the three months she had already been given because additional 
leave would have created an undue hardship, despite the fact that the additional leave 
had a set date of return); Pate v. Baker Tanks Gulf S., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 
(W.D. La. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s six-week leave of absence caused an undue 
hardship on the employer because customers were frustrated with the lack of knowl-
edgeable support from the other staff during the plaintiff’s absence). 
 289. See, e.g., Bisker v. GGS Info. Serv., Inc., No. CIV. 1:CV–07–1465, 2010 WL 
2265979, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2010) (holding that the employer “failed to meet its 
burden of demonstrating that the proposed accommodation [to work from home wa]s 
unreasonable or impose[d] an undue hardship on its business.”); Meachem v. Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water Div., 119 F. Supp. 3d 807, 817–18 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding 
that the defendant had not presented sufficient evidence to allow the court to analyze 
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Other courts held that a work from home accommodation would cause an un-
due hardship to the defendant.290 
Several cases involved requested modifications of the hours an employee 
worked, either requesting fewer hours291 or more flexible hours.292  For in-
stance, in McMillan v. City of New York, the plaintiff had schizophrenia that 
was treated with medication.293  He was a case manager for the defendant, do-
ing home visits, processing social assessments, and certifying clients’ Medi-
caid eligibility.294  The employer had a flex-time policy that allowed employees 
to arrive between 9:00-10:15 a.m., but because his medications made him 
drowsy, he often arrived to work late—after 11:00 a.m.295  This arrangement 
was approved for ten years.296  The employer eventually stopped allowing this 
 
the undue hardship factors and that without more, providing the plaintiff, who was an 
attorney, remote access to her files so that she could work from home when complica-
tions from her pregnancy put her on bed rest, did not create an undue hardship). 
 290. See, e.g., Stanley v. Lester M. Prange, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585 (E.D. Pa. 
1998) (stating that the loss in productivity caused by plaintiff, who was a log clerk for 
a trucking company, working from home and the additional time it would take for truck 
drivers to travel to plaintiff’s residence would be unduly costly to the defendant). 
 291. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harrison Cty., 639 Fed. App’x 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 
2016) (stating that the plaintiff’s request to work eight hours per day when all other 
corrections officers worked twelve-hour shifts caused an undue hardship); Kralik v. 
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the employer did not have to grant 
the plaintiff’s requested accommodation of not working overtime because doing so 
would conflict with the collective bargaining agreement’s seniority rights and would 
therefore cause an undue hardship); Zieba v. Showboat Marina Casino P’ship, 361 F. 
Supp. 2d 838, 844 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that there are material issues of fact re-
garding whether plaintiff’s accommodation request for shorter days would cause an 
undue hardship); Butka v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 649, 669–70 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004) (stating that there was an issue of fact regarding whether allowing the plain-
tiff, who was a manager at JC Penney, to work part-time would cause an undue hard-
ship); Kinlaw v. Alpha Baking Co., Inc., No. 02 C 1014, 2003 WL 21089042, at *6–7 
(N.D. Ill. May 14, 2003) (stating that the employer could not prove that allowing the 
plaintiff to work six hours per day instead of ten hours per day would cause an undue 
hardship even though the employer argued that this accommodation required the em-
ployer to force supervisors to work extra hours); Dropinski v. Douglas Cty., No. 
8:00CV313, 2001 WL 1580201, at *6 (D. Neb., Dec. 5, 2001) (holding that accommo-
dating the plaintiff’s inability to work overtime would cause an undue hardship for the 
employer); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that 
allowing the plaintiff to work part time would cause an undue hardship because it would 
eliminate an essential function of the job—working full time). 
 292. See, e.g., Crabill v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 708 F. Supp. 2d 542, 
547, 556 (W.D. N.C. 2010) (stating that allowing the plaintiff, who was a school guid-
ance counselor, to have a flexible work schedule would create an undue hardship), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, and remanded to 423 Fed. App’x 314 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 293. 711 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
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arrangement, claiming that it could not work because there was not a supervisor 
present after 6:00 p.m.297  The plaintiff’s suggested accommodation was to 
work through lunch and work late in order to bank time to make up for the late 
arrivals.298  In response to the employer’s alleged undue hardship defense, the 
court noted that the employer already had a policy of allowing employees to 
bank hours if they worked more than seven hours per day and to apply those 
banked hours against approved late arrivals.299  There was no evidence that pre-
approving the plaintiff’s late arrivals would cause an undue burden.300  Alt-
hough the court noted that the district court correctly concluded that assigning 
a supervisor past 6:00 p.m. would be an undue burden, the plaintiff was often 
unsupervised when he made home visits or when he had worked late in the 
past; so, there was not sufficient evidence of this arrangement causing an undue 
hardship.301  Finally, the employer argued that its collective bargaining agree-
ment precluded allowing employees to work through lunch unless they re-
ceived advance approval.302  But the court disagreed with the employer that the 
advanced approval mechanism would cause an undue hardship, stating that this 
pre-approval process would not cause “significant difficulty or expense.”303 
In a similar case, Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Institute, Inc., 
the plaintiff requested a flexible schedule as a reasonable accommodation for 
his arthritis.304  The court stated that the defendant needed to produce evidence 
demonstrating that a flexible schedule would cause a hardship—financial or 
otherwise.305  The only evidence the employer presented was that it would be 
burdensome to require the plaintiff’s supervisor to match his schedule, but the 
court had already found that there was a factual dispute as to whether the plain-
tiff needed constant supervision to perform the functions of the job.306 
The final structural norm that frequently arises in accommodation cases 
is a request to change the shift that the employee is scheduled to work.  This is 
especially true when the employee is scheduled to work night shifts or rotating 
shifts.307  For instance, in Grubb v. Southwest Airlines, the plaintiff, who was 
a flight instructor for the defendant, had sleep apnea and therefore requested 
afternoon-only shifts.308  The employer’s witnesses testified that the accommo-
dation would impose inordinate burdens on other employees and require the 
 
 297. Id. at 124. 
 298. Id. at 127–28. 
 299. Id. at 128. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. 209 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 305. Id. at 37. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the 
ADA Amendments Act, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 213, 243–47 (2016) [hereinafter Porter, 
Stigma] (discussing some of these cases). 
 308. 296 Fed. App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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employer to fundamentally alter its schedules; the court agreed and held that 
the accommodation would cause an undue hardship and was not required.309 
In prior work, I noted that most courts that had decided the issue of 
whether rotating shifts were an essential function of the job held that they 
were.310  Therefore, Holt v. Olmsted Township Board of Trustees311 was a sur-
prising case to me.  It was surprising because the court held that allowing the 
plaintiff, who was a civilian dispatcher for a police department, to work straight 
shifts instead of rotating shifts was a reasonable accommodation.312  The em-
ployer argued that this accommodation would impose an undue hardship be-
cause it would make other employees work the less desirable shift more of-
ten.313  The court held that this argument was just “employee grumbling” and 
did not rise to the level of undue hardship.314  Moreover, the defendant had not 
presented any evidence that it would incur financial stain or difficulties in staff-
ing if the shift change was instituted.315 
IV. THREE NOTABLE TRENDS 
As I was reviewing this body of cases, I was struck by the recurrence of 
three themes that were repeated over and over again in the cases.  The first 
theme I noticed is that courts frequently struggled with differentiating between 
reasonable accommodations and the undue hardship defense.  In other words, 
they held that some accommodations caused an undue hardship even when they 
did not meet the traditional undue hardship factors but rather seemed unrea-
sonable for some factor other than cost.316  To be clear, it is not just courts that 
are confused—scholars also debate the meaning of the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement and its relationship to the undue hardship defense.317 
 
 309. Id. at 388. 
 310. Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 243. 
 311. 43 F. Supp. 2d 812 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
 312. Id. at 815, 823–24. 
 313. Id. at 823. 
 314. Id. at 824.  In a similar case, the court held that accommodating the plaintiff’s 
day shift request to accommodate his psychiatric disability would not result in an undue 
hardship simply because other employees complained about the shift.  Vera v. Williams 
Hosp. Grp., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168–69 (D.P.R. 1999). 
 315. Holt, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
 316. See, e.g., Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that an 
unreasonable accommodation is one that causes an undue hardship). 
 317. Compare Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1148 (2010) (arguing that reasonable accommodations and un-
due hardship are flip sides of the same coin) with Porter, Martinizing, supra note 244, 
at 545–46 (arguing that “reasonable accommodation” has meaning and substance aside 
from whether or not it causes an undue hardship). 
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I also noted two other trends when exploring the undue hardship cases.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, both of these were concepts I had explored before.318  
First, a relatively large number of cases dealt with a concept I have identified 
as “special treatment stigma.”319  As I will elaborate on below, special treat-
ment stigma refers to the resentment of coworkers when accommodations 
given to employees with disabilities either place burdens on nondisabled 
coworkers or are accommodations that those nondisabled coworkers covet.320  
Special treatment stigma also manifests in courts often being reluctant to re-
quire employers to provide accommodations that place burdens on other em-
ployees, concluding that those accommodations create an undue hardship for 
the employer. 
Finally, the third trend I noticed in the cases was the prevalence of a phe-
nomenon I have called “withdrawn accommodations.”321  Withdrawn accom-
modations refers to the situation where an employer has provided an accom-
modation to an employee with a disability but, after a period of time, the em-
ployer takes the accommodation away.322  This happens either because the em-
ployer thought the accommodation was temporary and then realizes the em-
ployee will need it permanently or because a new supervisor comes onto the 
scene and disagrees with an accommodation that was previously provided.323  
Several of the undue hardship cases tackled this issue. 
A. Unreasonable Accommodation or Undue Hardship? 
As noted above, the most prominent theme in the undue hardship cases 
was the confusion over the meaning of the undue hardship defense in relation 
to the reasonable accommodation provision.  Recall the statutory language, 
which defines discrimination to include 
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or men-
tal limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who 
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate 
 
 318. This is not surprising because we are more likely to notice things that we are 
already familiar with.  This is called the “availability heuristic.”  See Kendra Cherry, 
How the Availability Heuristic Affects Decision-Making, VERYWELLMIND (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.verywellmind.com/availability-heuristic-2794824.  For instance, if 
you are shopping for a new car, and looking at one particular model, you are much 
more likely to notice that model of car on the roads than you were before you had 
considered it. 
 319. See generally Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 217.   I first coined this phrase 
in Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian The-
ory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 359 (2010). 
 320. Porter, Stigma, supra note 307, at 233–34. 
 321. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63 
DRAKE L. REV. 885 (2015) [hereinafter Porter, Withdrawn]. 
 322. Id. at 890. 
 323. Id. at 890 n.29. 
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that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the oper-
ation of the business of such covered entity . . . .324 
Courts are often confused about whether the reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship provisions are simply two sides of the same coin (i.e., an 
unreasonable accommodation is also an undue hardship) or whether they are 
separate inquiries (i.e., an accommodation can be unreasonable even if it does 
not cause an undue hardship). 
This confusion is perhaps most evident in early disability discrimination 
cases.  In one of the cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the court ap-
peared to conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry with the undue hard-
ship defense.325  In this case, the plaintiff, who suffered from dyslexia that se-
verely affected his ability to read, applied to work as a firefighter at West 
Point.326  Because he could not read from the firefighters’ manual as part of his 
physical examination, he was rejected.327  In determining whether there was an 
accommodation that would allow the plaintiff to safely perform his duties as a 
firefighter despite his inability to read, the court listed the undue hardship fac-
tors.328  It then immediately stated: 
If, after exploring these criteria, the finder of fact believes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that accommodating [the plaintiff] would en-
danger the health or safety of the fire fighters at West Point, then such 
accommodation is unreasonable, and the Secretary would have shown 
that the West Point fire fighting force did not illegally discriminate 
against [the plaintiff] because of his handicap.329 
In determining whether there was a reasonable accommodation that 
would allow the plaintiff to perform the duties of a firefighter, the court cited 
to the undue hardship factors and then immediately concluded that there was 
no accommodation that was reasonable.330  In other words, to this court, rea-
sonable accommodation and undue hardship were simply facets of the same 
inquiry. 
In another early ADA case, the plaintiff suffered from stress and depres-
sion and was diagnosed with Dythmia and agoraphobia after being moved from 
one department to another.331  The plaintiff’s requested accommodation was to 
be allowed to remain in her department without having any contact with her 
 
 324. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 325. See DiPompo v. W. Point Military Acad., 708 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 326. Id. at 542. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 550. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (S.D. Ga. 
1995). 
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supervisor.332  The court stated that this was not a “reasonable accommodation” 
and then defined reasonable accommodation as one that “does not impose an 
undue hardship on the employer.”333  Not surprisingly, the court held that re-
quiring an employer to employ a person in a particular department “while for-
bidding her supervisor from having any contact with her would be an undue 
burden on the employer.  Such a ludicrous notion would undermine the effec-
tiveness and authority of management.”334  Thus, the court held that the 
“[p]laintiff failed to request a ‘reasonable accommodation’ during her employ-
ment.”335 
Other courts seem to conflate the reasonable accommodation inquiry and 
the undue hardship defense without much discussion at all.  For instance, in 
Dropinski v. Douglas County, the plaintiff was an automotive equipment oper-
ator and was responsible for road maintenance.336  After he fell at work and 
injured his back, he could only return to work with restrictions of no heavy 
lifting and no overtime.337  The employer would not allow him to return and 
instead offered to hold open his job for one year with the hope that he would 
recover.338  In discussing the possible accommodations that would allow him 
to drive the trucks without any heavy lifting and to avoid overtime, the court 
held that these accommodations would amount to a restructuring of the job.339  
The court then summarily stated: “A restructuring of the job would place an 
undue burden on Douglas County.  Thus, Dropinski’s requested accommoda-
tions were unreasonable as a matter of law.”340 
Similarly, in Stanley v. Lester M. Prange, Inc., the plaintiff was a log clerk 
for a trucking company whose disability, a back injury, caused her to request a 
work-from-home accommodation, whereby the truck drivers would have to 
travel to her home so that she could review their logs.341  In discussing why a 
work-from-home accommodation was not required, the court conflated the rea-
sonable accommodation inquiry and undue hardship defense.342  The court 
stated that, based on the fact that there were safety concerns with the drivers 
parking their trucks by her home, “it would certainly be unreasonable and 
would cause an undue hardship on the [d]efendant to allow the [p]laintiff to 
work at home.”343  The court never discussed any cost issues at all—this is 
 
 332. Id. at 1080. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. No. 8:00CV313, 2001 WL 1580201 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2001). 
 337. Id. at *1. 
 338. Id. at *2. 
 339. Id. at *5. 
 340. Id. at *6. 
 341. 25 F. Supp. 2d 581, 582–83 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 342. See id. at 583–84. 
 343. Id. at 585. 
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another case where the court simply should have held that the accommodation 
was unreasonable.344 
In another case, Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., the plaintiff was seeking a part-
time schedule as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.345  Even 
though a “modified schedule” is listed in the statute as a possible reasonable 
accommodation,346 courts often hold (erroneously, in my opinion)347 that a re-
quest for a part-time schedule is a request to create a new position rather than 
to modify the hours of the current position.348  The court in Lamb used the same 
analysis, stating, “The ADA does not require that an employer create a position 
to accommodate a disabled employee.”349  The court also stated that the ADA 
does not “require an employer to accommodate an employee when that accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.”350  Nothing sur-
prising there.  But then the court stated that an “accommodation imposes an 
undue hardship if it requires elimination of an essential duty of the position in 
question.”351  This is a strange statement because normally courts hold that the 
elimination of an essential function of the job makes the accommodation not 
reasonable—not that it causes an undue hardship.352  And in fact, there is little 
 
 344. See id. 583–85.  In a similar case, the court held that allowing the plaintiff to 
have one day off to attend physical therapy for his disability would have meant that he 
could not perform his job as a sales manager, which required him to ride along with 
delivery driver trainees on delivery routes.  Switala v. Schwan’s Sales Enter., 231 F. 
Supp. 2d 672, 677 (N.D. Ohio 2002).  Accommodating his request for the day off would 
have meant that either the delivery route did not get completed, an inexperienced driver 
was sent alone, or his supervisor would have had to perform his job for him.  Id.  The 
court stated that “plaintiff’s last-minute request for leave was unreasonable, and ac-
commodating it . . . would have worked an undue hardship on defendants.”  Id. at 686. 
 345. 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 378 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 346. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2018).   
 347. Porter, Backlash, supra note 8, at 79; see also Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing 
the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3, 62 (2005). 
 348. See, e.g., White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 Fed. App’x 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2013); 
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to no discussion of the costs of providing the plaintiff with a part-time schedule, 
which is the focus of the undue hardship defense. 
Similarly, in Terrazas v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, Inc., after the 
plaintiff had back surgery, he had several physical restrictions that precluded 
him from performing his job.353  The employer did not reassign him to another 
position but instead placed him on leave.354  When the court was discussing his 
failure to accommodate claim, it stated that, because he had previously been 
removed from one of the positions to which he was applying due to perfor-
mance problems, “it would have constituted an undue hardship to require [the 
employer] to reassign Mr. Terrazas to that position as an accommodation for 
his disability.”355  The court also stated that “because the plaintiff [could not] 
seriously contest his inability to perform the essential functions of the front 
desk position irrespective of his physical disability, any accommodation the 
[employer] would have had to make to tailor that job’s duties to the plaintiff’s 
abilities would have constituted an undue hardship.”356  Again, this case con-
flates the reasonable accommodation provision and undue hardship defense by 
holding that an accommodation that is unreasonable necessarily causes an un-
due hardship. 
Many of these are older cases, where it makes some sense that the parties 
and courts are confused about the relationship between the reasonable accom-
modation provision and the undue hardship defense.  But even in some more 
recent cases the court’s analysis revealed confusion.  For instance, in Jernigan 
v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was working as a service 
technician when he injured his back on the job, which led to restrictions of not 
being able to lift more than fifteen pounds and no climbing.357  He was given 
light duty accommodations until it was determined that his injury was perma-
nent, and then the employer refused to accommodate him.358  The court’s anal-
ysis turned on whether there was a reasonable accommodation that would al-
low the plaintiff to perform the duties of the technician position despite his 
limitations on heavy lifting and climbing.359  The accommodation contem-
plated was a manual override, or “helper tickets,” which were routinely used 
to have technicians dispatched “to assist other technicians in performing duties 
that were either technically or physically difficult for whatever reason for an 
employee to perform.”360  The employer argued that allowing the plaintiff to 
use this manual override system to avoid the heavy lifting and climbing duties 
would cause an undue hardship.361  The court stated that the employer had not 
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yet proven as a matter of law that this accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship and then stated that “the purported ‘unfairness’ of accommodations 
entailing reassignment of a minor portion of the duties of a disabled employee 
where many employees are available to perform such duties does not as a mat-
ter of law mean that the accommodation is per se unreasonable.”362  Again, this 
case reveals the court’s confusion about the relationship between the reasona-
ble accommodation provision and the undue hardship defense. 
Arguably, this confusion should have been cleared up by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.363  In this case, the 
Court was called upon to resolve the conflict between a disabled employee’s 
right to reassignment to a vacant position as an accommodation and the supe-
rior seniority rights of other employees who also sought reassignment to the 
vacant position.364  In doing so, the Court had to address the relationship be-
tween the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship de-
fense.  The plaintiff had argued that the seniority system had nothing to do with 
whether the accommodation was reasonable; rather, it should only come up as 
part of the undue hardship analysis.365  Otherwise, reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship would be “virtual mirror images—creating redundancy in 
the statute.”366  The Court disagreed with the plaintiff, stating that the statute 
refers to the “undue hardship on the operation of the business.”367  And yet a  
demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable be-
cause of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employ-
ees—say, because it will lead to . . . modification of employee benefits 
to which an employer, looking at the matter from the perspective of the 
business itself, may be relatively indifferent.368   
The Court also discussed the burdens of proof for these issues.  The plaintiff 
must show that the accommodation seems “reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinar-
ily or in the run of cases.”369  And then the employer must show case-specific 
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circumstances to demonstrate an undue hardship under the particular circum-
stances.370 
Thus, my reading of this case is that the Court disagreed with the idea that 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are simply two sides of the 
same coin.  Yet, as we saw above in the discussion of the Jernigan case,371 
some courts still appear to conflate reasonable accommodation and undue hard-
ship.  Furthermore, at least one highly regarded disability law scholar also be-
lieves that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are flip sides of the 
same coin.  In his article, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 
Professor Mark Weber argued that reasonable accommodation and undue hard-
ship are two sides of the same coin.372  Specifically, relying on the “ADA’s 
text, its history, its agency interpretation, and its social context,” Weber argued 
that 
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are a single concept.  
The words form parts of a statutory sentence that links them together 
into the same statutory term.  The duty to make reasonable accommo-
dations exists up to the limit of undue hardship.  At the point of undue 
hardship, the accommodation is no longer reasonable . . . .  If “unrea-
sonable accommodation” seems not to make sense, it is because reason-
able accommodation lacks a meaning other than the absence of undue 
hardship.  The terms should be read together, and the opposite of the 
one is the other.  Hence the play on words to make the title of this arti-
cle: There is no such thing as unreasonable accommodation or due hard-
ship.373 
Although Weber’s article made convincing arguments, I am ultimately 
not persuaded.  In my article, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, I argued that reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are 
not two sides of the same coin.374  Instead, I argued that “there is some limita-
tion to an employer’s obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation be-
sides the undue hardship limit.  In other words, some accommodations are ‘un-
reasonable’ even though they do not cause an undue hardship to the em-
ployer.”375  Some examples that I identified include: (1) requiring an employer 
to create a position for a disabled employee; (2) requiring an employer to allow 
a disabled employee to bump another employee out of his job; (3) requiring an 
employer to promote an employee with a disability; (4) requiring an employer 
to provide an accommodation that is of a personal nature, such as medication 
or assistive devices like eyeglasses or hearing aids that the employee uses in 
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his personal life; and (5) requiring an employer to monitor an employee’s med-
ication or health condition.376  These examples are ones that are always held to 
be unreasonable.  Similarly, there are some accommodations that are some-
times deemed unreasonable.  For example, some courts have held that provid-
ing assistance with transportation to work is unreasonable.377  Similarly, some 
courts have held that a work-from-home accommodation is unreasonable.378 
The point of this discussion is not to argue that I am right and Weber is 
wrong (although I do believe that).379  The point is to explain that the confusion 
in the cases is not that surprising even though I think it might be frustrating to 
litigants, their lawyers, and the courts.  And I think it is heartening that most of 
the cases I have identified in this Section are early cases, decided shortly after 
the ADA was passed and before the Court’s decision in Barnett.  It indicates 
that we are hopefully on the right track. 
B. Special Treatment Stigma 
The second trend I noticed in the undue hardship cases was a significant 
number of cases describing what I have termed “special treatment stigma.”  As 
described above, special treatment stigma arises when nondisabled coworkers 
are resentful of an accommodation needed by an employee with a disability 
either because it does (or is perceived to) place burdens on other employees or 
because it is an accommodation that other employees covet.380  Employers are 
aware of this resentment (and sometimes believe the resentment is or will be 
worse than it actually is) and this (along with the actual or perceived costs of 
accommodations) causes employers to be less willing to hire or promote em-
ployees who will need accommodations (seen as “special treatment”) in the 
workplace.381  A significant portion of the undue hardship cases revealed that 
burdens on coworkers were a significant concern of both employers and the 
courts. 
Before a discussion of the cases, it is important to remember that the four 
statutory factors of undue hardship do not explicitly mention the effect on other 
employees.382  Only the EEOC regulations suggest that “the impact on the abil-
ity of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s 
ability to conduct business” is an additional factor that should be considered in 
the undue hardship analysis.383  Courts often cite to this EEOC regulation when 
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holding that an accommodation does not have to be granted because of burdens 
it may place on other employees. 
For instance, in an early ADA case, Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, the court 
discussed the employer’s undue hardship defense.384  It first noted that an “ac-
commodation that would result in other employees having to work harder or 
longer is not required under the ADA.”385  The court then stated that requiring 
other workers to assist the plaintiff would involve a reallocation of some job 
duties, which would affect the ability of other employees to do their jobs.386  
Thus, the court declared, “Such an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the defendant and is not required under the ADA.”387 
In Mertes v. Westfield Ford, the plaintiff argued that he would be quali-
fied to work as a technician if the employer directed his coworkers to perform 
tasks that involved heavy lifting.388  The court stated that providing that ac-
commodation would have been so disruptive to other employees that it would 
have been unreasonable, and “it is well established that an accommodation that 
imposes an ‘undue hardship’ on an employer’s business operation need not be 
made.”389  In response to the plaintiff’s argument that it was not uncommon for 
certain tasks to be performed by the most qualified technician for that specific 
task, the court stated that “splitting certain jobs between technicians with dif-
ferent qualifications is materially different from requiring other technicians to 
assist a disabled employee with just about every job.”390 
 Similarly, in Butka v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., because of the plaintiff’s 
psychiatric disability, her doctor recommended she be allowed to temporarily 
work part-time in her job as a manager.391  In discussing whether this would 
cause an undue hardship, the court discussed that while the employer had tem-
porarily allowed her to work a part-time schedule (tasks that she normally 
would have done had to be reassigned to other employees), those employees 
would have to complete their own work plus the plaintiff’s duties without any 
extra pay.392  The defendant alleged that this “atmosphere contributed to low 
morale in the store and to a decline in sales volume as well.”393  Ultimately, 
however, the court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the accommodation caused an undue hardship because the employer 
did not actually replace the plaintiff for six months after she was fired.394  In 
other words, if filling in for the plaintiff’s part-time schedule was really causing 
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the employer an undue hardship, presumably she would have been replaced 
sooner. 
Other cases have held that an accommodation creates an undue hardship 
in part because of the special treatment stigma the accommodation causes.  For 
instance, in Grubb v. Southwest Airlines, the plaintiff was a flight instructor 
with sleep apnea, which caused attendance problems as well as the plaintiff 
occasionally sleeping during meetings.395  The accommodation that plaintiff 
requested was a set shift assignment.396  The court held that such an accommo-
dation would impose “inordinate burdens on other [Southwest Airlines] em-
ployees and require [Southwest Airlines] to ‘fundamentally alter’ its sched-
ules” and was therefore not required.397 
In Crabill v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the plaintiff’s 
disability led her to request various accommodations for her position as a guid-
ance counselor in defendant’s school district, including “a reduced student 
caseload, not carrying heavy materials, and not driving in the dark or on ice or 
snow.”398  Some internal employer communications revealed concern over spe-
cial treatment stigma, specifically regarding placing burdens on other employ-
ees.399  At one point, the plaintiff’s manager emailed the human resources de-
partment for guidance on how to address plaintiff’s request for a workload re-
duction, stating that it would be hard to reduce the plaintiff’s workload because 
it would just be adding additional work to other counselors.400  Apropos of the 
discussion in the above Section, the court’s analysis interchangeably referred 
to the plaintiff’s accommodation requests as either unreasonable or causing an 
undue hardship.  For instance, the court held that reducing the plaintiff’s work-
load would have shifted these duties to other counselors in the department, 
thereby increasing their workload, which the court held would be an unreason-
able accommodation.401  But in discussing whether the plaintiff’s request for a 
flexible work schedule was reasonable, the court pointed to the fact that any 
students who were assigned to the plaintiff while she was absent would lead to 
other counselors having to see those students, which would result in an undue 
burden.402 
Similarly, in EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., the charging party (Strickland) was 
a cashier at a RiteAid drug store who was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of both 
knees, which “made it difficult for her to walk without the assistance of a cane 
or to stand for prolonged periods of time.”403  Accordingly, when she did not 
have customers at the register, Strickland would occasionally sit down in a 
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lawn chair behind the register.404   The employer was unhappy with this be-
cause the cashiers were supposed to “productively work on the sales floor  . . . 
when they were not helping a customer at the register.”405  Eventually, the em-
ployer refused to continue allowing Strickland to sit while working.406 
Citing the Dey case discussed above, the court started its undue hardship 
discussion with the often-cited statement that “accommodations that result in 
other employees having to work harder or longer are often denied on the ground 
of undue hardship.”407  Because the RiteAid store operated on a lean staffing 
model—where there are generally only one or two cashiers and a manager on 
duty, and the cashiers were expected to stock merchandise or clean—“having 
a cashier sit idly for half of her shift would necessarily cause productiv[it]y and 
morale issues.”408  The EEOC countered that the sitting accommodation was 
essentially cost-free and that the defendant could easily absorb the impact 
caused by the accommodation because it was a large corporation with over 
80,000 employees.409  The court responded that the true cost of the accommo-
dation and its impact should be judged at the store where Strickland worked.410  
Allowing Strickland to sit would mean that other employees would have to do 
her job duties, and the court held “the accommodation me[t] the definition of 
‘undue hardship’ under the ADA.”411 
To be clear, not all courts hold that accommodations that cause burdens 
on other employees create an undue hardship for the employer.  In Holt v. 
Olmsted Township Board of Trustees, the court disagreed with the employer 
that an accommodation requiring other employees to work a less desirable shift 
would result in an undue hardship.412  The court emphasized that “employee 
disapproval of a proposed accommodation, in and of itself, does not rise to the 
level of undue hardship.”413  Neither does the fact that an accommodation 
would force other employees to work an altered schedule.414  The court held 
that defendant’s evidence amounted to “employee grumbling,” which did not 
rise to the level of an undue hardship.415  Thus, the defendant did not meet its 
burden of establishing an undue hardship.416 
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Similarly, in Morse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the plaintiff was an inflight 
supervisor, whose job included overseeing other flight attendants and super-
vising them during flights.417  Because of back problems, the plaintiff’s doctor 
told her that she was unable to fly.418  The employer at first accommodated this 
restriction by asking other inflight supervisors to perform the “check rides” of 
flight attendants who reported to the plaintiff, which did not cause any notable 
problems.419  Because the plaintiff could not complete the required recurrent 
training due to her no-flying restriction, she was placed on leave and eventually 
terminated.420  In discussing whether the employer must allow the plaintiff to 
continue working as an in-flight supervisor without requiring her to fly, the 
court rejected the employer’s undue hardship defense, stating that [the em-
ployer] “ha[d] offered no detailed evidence as to the statutory factors to sub-
stantiate that allowing plaintiff to remain employed in a non-flying capacity 
would have been unduly burdensome.”421  In response to the employer’s argu-
ment that accommodating plaintiff’s accommodation request would require an-
other inflight supervisor to “perform [the] plaintiff’s inflight observation du-
ties, resulting in additional costs and loss of scheduling continuity,”422 the court 
credited the plaintiff’s evidence that other inflight supervisors “gladly took on 
inflight duties without resulting scheduling difficulties” and held that the ac-
commodation did not impose an undue burden on the employer.423 
Finally, in Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the employer because the district court improperly relied 
on the burdens placed on other employees by a schedule accommodation when 
finding that the employer had proved its undue hardship defense.424  In this 
case, the plaintiff-doctor experienced problems related to a metastatic islet cell 
tumor—a form of cancer.425  He continued working, but he could not perform 
night and weekend shift duty.426  The employer accommodated this for a period 
of time but eventually refused to continue the accommodation, leading the 
plaintiff to take forced disability leave.427  In discussing whether the requested 
accommodation would cause an undue hardship, the court disagreed with the 
district court’s conclusion that requiring other physicians to cover the plain-
tiff’s night and weekend shifts would result in an undue hardship.428  The court 
noted that the undue hardship defense is an affirmative defense and that the 
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employer had never introduced evidence of its financial resources, the costs of 
the accommodation, or the impact of those costs on the employer.429  Although 
the court recognized that if the plaintiff were relieved from night and weekend 
duty, the burden of these “not-insignificant responsibilities would fall on other 
doctors,” it concluded that “without concrete information,” it could not hold 
that “as a matter of law that the burden was so disproportionately heavy as to 
absolve the [employer] from its reasonable accommodation obligations under 
the ADA.”430 
Most of these cases focused on the burden an accommodation places on 
other employees.  But another way that special treatment stigma manifests is 
when employees are upset or resentful about the accommodation because it is 
one they also covet. 
An example of this was found in McDonald v. Menino, which involved 
two plaintiffs who were physically disabled and fired by the City of Boston for 
“failing to comply with Boston’s municipal residency ordinance.”431  One of 
the plaintiffs could not comply with the residency requirement because she 
lived with family members (who lived outside of Boston) who cared for her 
and she could not afford a private nurse.432  The other plaintiff used a wheel-
chair and could not find accessible housing in Boston.433  The court fairly easily 
rejected the employer’s undue hardship defense, noting that the employer did 
not specify the hardship it would have endured if forced to grant a waiver of 
the residency requirement.434  The court noted that the plaintiffs successfully 
performed their jobs for ten years without any accommodation.435  Instead, the 
court surmised that the employer “fear[ed] the deleterious precedent that an 
exception for these plaintiffs might pose in its efforts to enforce the residency 
policy on other employees.”436  Ultimately, it was not decided whether the 
problem of enforcing the residency requirement amidst employees who obtain 
a waiver of the policy as an accommodation for a disability would cause an 
undue hardship because the employer had not yet attempted to enforce its new 
residency requirement on a citywide basis.437 
Similarly, in Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., the plaintiff had 
several disabilities that made it difficult for her to stand or sit for long periods 
of time.438  Some of her supervisors had allowed her to bring a stool to work to 
use at the cashier station, but others had refused to allow this accommodation, 
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asserting that “other employees had complained that [the plaintiff] was receiv-
ing unfair treatment.”439  Without this accommodation, the plaintiff was unable 
to perform her position and was forced to go on leave.440  When addressing the 
employer’s assertion of the undue hardship defense, the court stated: 
The defendants have not set forth specific facts indisputably demon-
strating that the use of a stool would have presented an undue hardship 
for the company.  While the defendants allege that other co-workers had 
complained about unfair treatment, given [the plaintiff’s] and other 
workers’ testimony that she was able to perform her job adequately 
when using the stool, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether this accommodation would have imposed an ‘undue hardship’ 
on Family Dollar . . . .441 
Another case addressing this same resentment is Vera v. Williams Hospi-
tality Group, Inc., where the plaintiff requested to be placed on the day shift to 
accommodate her disability.442  The employer alleged that changing the plain-
tiff’s shift would cause an undue hardship—specifically, that other employees 
who had more seniority than the plaintiff were upset by the fact that the plaintiff 
had been given a day shift at one point.443  The court disagreed and held that 
there was an issue of fact regarding whether accommodating the plaintiff con-
stituted a hardship for the defendant.444  The court stated: 
Although [the d]efendants state that employees with more seniority 
would have complained over [the p]laintiff being assigned to the day 
shift, the extent of such complaints is far from established.  Although 
employee disapproval does not per se rise to the threshold of undue 
hardship, if such protest reaches “chaotic personnel problems,” the ac-
commodation will result in undue hardship.445 
A final case addressed this issue indirectly.  In Stone v. City of Mount 
Vernon, the plaintiff was a firefighter who had an off-duty accident that left 
him a paraplegic.446  He asked to be assigned to a light-duty position, but the 
employer refused.447  One of the witnesses testified that the employer was con-
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cerned about assigning the plaintiff to a light-duty position permanently be-
cause it did not want to have an “overload” of disabled individuals in those 
jobs.448  Relevant portions of this witness’ deposition testimony include: 
I don’t think there’s a finer young person I ever met than [the plaintiff] 
and I think he would be an asset up there.  I just envisioned what hap-
pens or what would happen down the road.  Would we be forced to put 
everybody that got hurt there?  Would it open the door for individuals 
who may already have some sort of a physical—a physical handicap 
who are not capable of meeting this standard[?]449 
The court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the accom-
modation would cause the employer an undue hardship.450  It stated: 
The concern expressed by [the employer] that operations would be ham-
pered if the Department . . . were forced to hire [five to ten] disabled 
persons is not material to the present case.  Each request for a reasonable 
accommodation under the federal disability statutes must be decided on 
the basis of the existing circumstances.  To the extent that an employer 
has needs for a number of persons who have no disability, the number 
of employees already on staff who had disabilities would be a material 
factor to be considered.  The suggestion that hiring [five to ten] disabled 
persons would be an undue hardship is not a defense when the employer 
has hired none.451 
Although the court does not say it as explicitly as it could have, the em-
ployer here was worried about special treatment stigma.  The employer was 
worried that if it gave the light-duty accommodation to the plaintiff, it would 
experience a backlash from other employees who desired a similar accommo-
dation. 
As is obvious from above, courts are not consistent in how they address 
issues of special treatment stigma.  Because the ADAAA has expanded the 
protected class of individuals with disabilities, we should expect to see more 
employees seeking accommodations.  This increase in the number of individ-
uals with disabilities seeking accommodations has the possibility to exacerbate 
special treatment stigma, as employers struggle to find ways to accommodate 
more employees and those accommodations place burdens on other employ-
ees.452  But it is also possible that, if providing accommodations becomes the 
new normal, employees might become accustomed to accommodating each 
other.453  And perhaps more importantly, employers might start restructuring 
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their workplaces to provide accommodations more easily to all employees who 
need them.454 
C. Withdrawn Accommodations 
The third trend I noticed in the undue hardship cases was what I refer to 
as “withdrawn accommodations.”  As I stated above, withdrawn accommoda-
tions are when an employer has provided an accommodation to an employee 
with a disability but, after a period of time, the employer takes it away.  This 
often happens either because what the employer thought was a temporary ac-
commodation has become permanent or because a new supervisor comes onto 
the scene and disagrees with an accommodation that was previously pro-
vided.455 
As I discussed in other work, which explored whether employers who had 
withdrawn previously-provided accommodations violated the ADA, courts 
vary on what weight they give to the fact that an employer had previously ac-
commodated a disabled employee.456  Some courts hold that the fact an em-
ployer previously offered an accommodation indicates that the accommodation 
is reasonable.457  Other courts hold that just because an employer was kind 
enough to provide an accommodation on a trial basis does not mean that the 
employer should be obligated to continue providing it once the accommodation 
becomes permanent or has started to cause a hardship.458 
Several of the undue hardship cases I reviewed for this Article tackled 
this issue.  Because my prior Article discovered that this issue of withdrawn 
accommodations was more often decided in favor of employers, I was shocked 
that all of the undue hardship cases addressing this issue ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs—denying the employer’s dispositive motions and allowing the plain-
tiff’s claim to survive to be litigated another day.  Perhaps this had something 
to do with the fact that the undue hardship argument was not very strong in the 
first place.  In other words, the employer might have been better off arguing 
that the accommodation was simply unreasonable rather than arguing that the 
accommodation caused an undue hardship. 
For instance, in EEOC. v. Placer ARC,459 the defendant (a non-profit or-
ganization that provided programs for individuals with disabilities) hired the 
plaintiff, who was deaf, as an instructional aide.  Her job requirements “in-
cluded reading information in client files, creating reports detailing the client’s 
behavior, and creating daily reports.”460  The employer provided an American 
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Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter for almost every meeting the plaintiff at-
tended.461  Later, the employer transferred the plaintiff to a different location, 
where she was only occasionally provided an ASL interpreter and accordingly 
was confused and frustrated.462  The plaintiff sent a letter requesting a sign 
language interpreter for any meetings as a reasonable accommodation, but it is 
unclear from the facts if the request was ever granted.463  Eventually, the plain-
tiff resigned, claiming that the lack of a sign language interpreter, among other 
things, prevented her from doing her job well.464 
The employer raised an undue hardship defense and supported it with 
submitted declarations, which stated that “a financial hardship [was] posed by 
hiring a certified ASL interpreter.”465  In response, the court stated that “the 
fact that defendant retained an interpreter for at least some staff meetings from 
2005 to 2008 . . . , and hired [another employee] at least in part to serve as an 
interpreter, undermine[d] its showing of hardship.”466 
Similarly, in Morse v. JetBlue Airways Corp., the plaintiff requested an 
accommodation that would allow her to continue as an in-flight supervisor 
even though she could no longer fly on planes.467  Among the many factors the 
court considered in deciding that the plaintiff’s suggested accommodation did 
not cause an undue hardship on the employer, the court noted “the fact that 
[the] plaintiff satisfactorily worked for defendant for six months in a non-flying 
capacity suggest[ed] that [the] plaintiff’s accommodation request would not 
have been unduly burdensome on defendant.”468 
In another case, the court was not as explicit about its reasoning but ulti-
mately ruled in favor of the employee on his failure-to-accommodate claim.  In 
Jernigan v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, the plaintiff was a service 
technician for the defendant-employer when he suffered an on-the-job injury 
that resulted in a back impairment restricting his ability to lift more than fifteen 
pounds and to climb poles.469  When he returned from leave he was given light-
duty accommodations, which entailed the company assigning him his regular 
tasks and then “manually overriding or accommodating assignments that re-
quired heavy lifting or [pole] climbing.”470  Once supervisors learned that the 
plaintiff’s injury would be permanent, the employer withdrew the accommo-
dations, claiming that it was company policy to not accommodate a permanent 
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disability.471  Eventually the plaintiff exhausted his leave and was termi-
nated.472  Although the court did not discuss the withdrawn accommodation 
explicitly, it did require the employer to actually prove that the previously pro-
vided accommodation would cause an undue hardship if given permanently.473 
Similarly, in McMillan v. City of New York, the plaintiff was a case man-
ager for his employer and he had schizophrenia, which was treated with medi-
cation.474  His morning medications made him drowsy and he often arrived late 
to work.475  His tardy arrivals were explicitly or tacitly approved for at least ten 
years; however, eventually the plaintiff’s supervisor (at the request of her su-
pervisor) refused to approve any more late arrivals, simply stating that she 
“wouldn’t be doing [her] job if [she] continued to approve a lateness every 
single day.”476  After this practice was stopped, the plaintiff made several re-
quests for a later start time to avoid being disciplined for tardiness.477  He was 
told that it was not possible “because he could not work past 6:00 p.m. without 
a supervisor present.”478  His tardiness led to a thirty-day suspension without 
pay.479 
When analyzing whether on-time arrival was an essential function of his 
position, the court initially stated that his suggested accommodation of working 
through lunch and working late in order to bank time, and then using this 
banked time against future late arrivals, was a plausible accommodation.480  
Analyzing the undue hardship issue, the court held that assigning a supervisor 
to work past 6:00 p.m. would constitute an undue hardship.481  But the court 
noted that the plaintiff “was presumably unsupervised when he made home 
visits for his clients or when he worked past 7:00 p.m.” from home.482  It was 
unclear whether those hours could be banked.483  The court also noted that even 
if he could not bank post-6:00 p.m., he was willing to work though his lunch 
and could bank that time.484  The court disagreed with the district court, which 
had held that because the collective bargaining agreement had a provision that 
precluded employees from working through lunch unless they received ad-
vance approval, this accommodation would cause an undue hardship.485  The 
court stated that such pre-approval did not strike it as “requiring significant 
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difficulty or expense.”486  Thus, the court stated that it could not find as a matter 
of law that the plaintiff’s “suggested accommodations would constitute undue 
hardships to the [employer].”487  Thus, even though the court did not analyze 
this under the rubric of “withdrawn accommodations,” it did seem willing to 
consider the past history of the plaintiff being allowed to bank time to make up 
for his late arrivals. 
Finally, in another case of withdrawn accommodations, the court in Tal-
ley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., held in favor of the plaintiff, reversing 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer-de-
fendant.488  In this case, the plaintiff suffered from degenerative osteoarthritis 
of her spine, which caused pain in her legs and back that made it difficult for 
her to stand for long periods of time.489  After she fell at work, the pain was so 
bad that “she could not stand for more than fifteen minutes without experienc-
ing severe pain.”490  Accordingly, some of her supervisors allowed her to bring 
a stool to work to use at her cashier station.491  Eventually the employer with-
drew that permission, and because she could no longer perform the tasks of her 
position, she was forced to take medical leave.492  Although the court never 
explicitly discussed the fact that the accommodation had been previously pro-
vided and then withdrawn, the court did rule that the employer had not estab-
lished the undue hardship defense.493 
V. CONCLUSION 
The undue hardship defense is an instrumental piece of the reasonable 
accommodation puzzle under the ADA.  And yet, it has received much less 
attention in case law than the other components of the reasonable accommoda-
tion analysis, such as determining the essential functions of the job, exploring 
whether an accommodation is reasonable, and analyzing whether the employer 
engaged in the interactive process.  The undue hardship provision has also re-
ceived very little attention by scholars.  After the ADAAA made it much more 
likely that cases would proceed to a discussion of the merits—including dis-
cussions of reasonable accommodations and the correlating undue hardship de-
fense—it seemed time to give the undue hardship defense a closer look. 
What I found was both surprising and unsurprising.  It was surprising that, 
at first glance, there seemed to be so many undue hardship cases.494  But, upon 
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closer look, only 120 of them actually discussed the undue hardship provision 
at any length, which was still more than I had expected to find.  And yet, an 
even closer look revealed that only sixteen of them actually involved costs,495 
which is the main focus of the statutory language of the ADA’s undue hardship 
defense.496  This is because accommodations that are truly expensive are rare, 
and the reasons that most employers object to accommodations are because 
they appear to interfere with the business or, more likely, because of special 
treatment stigma.  So, the fact that there were so few cases that actually dis-
cussed costs was not surprising. 
Finally, the three themes identified in this Article were also not surprising 
to me even though I did not begin this project looking for them.  Courts and 
scholars will continue to be confused by, or to debate, the interrelationship be-
tween the reasonable accommodation provision and the undue hardship de-
fense.  The reluctance to provide accommodations when those accommoda-
tions seem like special treatment will continue to vex employers and courts.  
Finally, courts will continue to struggle with how to analyze the situation where 
an employer provides an accommodation for a period of time and then takes it 
away. 
In sum, even though my initial gut reaction that the undue hardship pro-
vision played a fairly limited role in determining if and when employers have 
to provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities was correct, the in-
stances where it does play a role in the outcome provide crucial insight into the 
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